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KISOR V. WILKIE AS A LIMIT ON AUER DEFERENCE IN THE
SENTENCING CONTEXT
ABSTRACT
While there has been increased attention on the necessity of criminal justice
reform in the United States, limited attention has been paid to the role that the
United States Sentencing Commission has played in exacerbating the very
problems that it was designed to address. Though the Sentencing Commission
was initially envisioned as a body that would protect criminal defendants from
sentencing disparities, it has morphed into a body that has limited effectiveness
in reaching that goal due to its misuse of commentary as a tool to effect
substantive change in sentencing policy to the detriment of criminal defendants.
Commentary was initially designed as a flexible tool that the Sentencing
Commission could use to interpret and explain the sentencing guidelines, but it
has increasingly been used by the Commission to replace amendments to the
guidelines themselves. This shift might seem insignificant on its face, but, in
reality, it has subjected criminal defendants to years of additional imprisonment
in the absence of the protections that Congress initially intended, because courts
have been required to defer to this commentary in most cases by an
administrative law doctrine known as Auer deference.
This Comment proposes that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kisor
v. Wilkie to integrate the test for Chevron deference into the test for Auer
deference presents an opportunity for courts to address this problem. This
Comment then argues that courts should strictly apply the traditional tools of
statutory construction and use the rule of lenity in determining whether (1) a
sentencing guideline is genuinely ambiguous and (2) the Sentencing
Commission’s interpretation of that guideline in commentary is reasonable.
Applying the test for Auer deference in this manner would drastically reduce the
frequency with which commentary receives deference from the courts,
something that would protect criminal defendants from changes in sentencing
policy that are enacted in the absence of the protections provided for in the
Sentencing Reform Act. Moreover, this change would encourage the Sentencing
Commission to make substantive changes to sentencing policy by amending the
sentencing guidelines themselves—not by amending the commentary—which
would benefit criminal defendants and society more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
Like 97.4% of federal defendants convicted of felony or class A
misdemeanor offenses,1 Miguel Nieves-Borrero entered into a plea agreement
with the federal government.2 As part of the plea agreement, Mr. Nieves pleaded
guilty to aiding and abetting a convicted felon in the possession of a firearm,3
and the government agreed that the recommended punishment under the federal
sentencing guidelines was ten to sixteen months of imprisonment.4 Mr. Nieves
and the government also “agree[d] to recommend a term of imprisonment at the
lower end of the applicable [sentencing] guideline range.”5 Unfortunately for
Mr. Nieves, the court was not bound to the sentence recommended in this plea
agreement.6 Instead, as part of the sentencing process, the court considered a
presentence report—prepared by a probation officer—which recommended a
sentence that drastically departed from the one that the government had agreed
to recommend.7
The presentence report, unlike the plea agreement, accounted for Mr.
Nieves’s two prior convictions, which triggered a prior offense enhancement8

1
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
8, 56–58 tbl.11 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reportsand-sourcebooks/2018/2018-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf.
2
United States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 2017).
3
Id.; see U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) [hereinafter 2018
GUIDELINES MANUAL]. Because Mr. Nieves’s crime was a federal offense, the sentencing guidelines served as
the starting point for his sentencing. 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra, at ch. 1, pt. A.2; United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must . . . take them into
account when sentencing.”).
4
Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 6. The plea agreement did not consider Mr. Nieves’s prior convictions nor
stipulate a criminal history category for him, factors that affect the sentencing ranges that apply under the
Guidelines Manual. Id.
5
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow for the
government to recommend or request a specific sentence or sentencing range as part of a plea agreement, though
it is not binding on the court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING:
THE BASICS 29 n.39 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchprojects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/201811_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf (describing the role that the Guidelines
Manual plays in federal plea agreements).
6
See Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 7. The court has the discretion “to accept or reject [a] plea agreement
immediately or defer a decision.” 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 6B1.1 cmt. In commentary, the
Sentencing Commission “recommends that the court defer acceptance of [a] plea agreement until the court has
reviewed the presentence report.” Id.
7
Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 7. Federal probation officers prepare presentence reports after conducting
an interview with the defendant. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 6. The presentence report contains
information about the offense, the offender, the statutory range of punishment, and the relevant sentencing
guidelines. Id.
8
Under the Guidelines Manual, an offender’s sentence may be enhanced if the offender has certain prior
convictions. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, CRIMINAL HISTORY 10–18 (2018),
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under the sentencing guidelines.9 Because of these prior convictions, the
presentence report calculated that the applicable sentencing guidelines range for
Mr. Nieves was seventy to eighty-seven months of imprisonment,10 which stood
in stark contrast to the fifteen months of imprisonment that the government had
ultimately recommended at Mr. Nieves’s sentencing hearing.11 Considering all
the relevant sentencing factors, the court sentenced Mr. Nieves to seventy
months of imprisonment.12 While the sentence itself is jarring in light of the
government’s recommendation, the most alarming aspect is the role that
administrative law played in depriving Mr. Nieves of his liberty at an extreme
expense to his family13 and the State.14
Through an administrative deference doctrine known as Auer deference,15
the Supreme Court has counseled that deference to an administrative agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation is appropriate “unless [the interpretation] is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”16 And, the Supreme Court
has sanctioned the use of Auer deference in the context of federal sentencing, so
courts frequently have to defer to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretations
of the sentencing guidelines as they are presented in commentary.17 The
Supreme Court has consistently found that such deference is appropriate despite
the troubling fact “that the Sentencing Commission wields the authority to
dispense ‘significant, legally binding prescriptions governing application of
governmental power against private individuals—indeed, application of the

https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2018_Primer_Criminal_History.pdf.
9
Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 7. Mr. Nieves had prior convictions for fourth-degree aggravated battery
and attempt to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
At the time of his sentencing, Mr. Nieves had one child. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 23, NievesBorrero, 856 F.3d 5 (No. 15-2154).
14
In Fiscal Year 2018, it cost $37,449 per year ($102.60 per day) to house a federal inmate in a Bureau
of Prisons facility. See Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee (COIF), 84 Fed. Reg. 63,891,
63,891–92 (Nov. 19, 2019).
15
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
16
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
17
See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (“We decide that commentary in the Guidelines
Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal
statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”). “Commentary” is text “that
accompanies the guideline sections [and] may serve a number of purposes. First, it may interpret the guideline
or explain how it is to be applied . . . . Second, the commentary may suggest circumstances which, in the view
of the Commission, may warrant departure from the guidelines . . . . Finally, the commentary may provide
background information, including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying
promulgation of the guideline.” 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1B1.7.
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ultimate governmental power, short of capital punishment.’”18 While some
judges have resisted the use of Auer deference in the sentencing context,19 the
Supreme Court has neglected to revisit the doctrine’s application to
commentary,20 leaving criminal defendants like Mr. Nieves at the whim of the
Sentencing Commission—an appointed body that does not reflect Congress’s
original intent.21
In Mr. Nieves’s case, the failure of his plea agreement to consider his two
prior convictions was erroneous, and the presentence report and court were
correct to consider these convictions as part of the sentencing process.22
However, the application of a prior offense enhancement for one of these
convictions—attempt to possess with intent to distribute controlled
substances—was extremely problematic and troublesome, as the enhancement
was based solely on an interpretation of the underlying sentencing guideline that
the Sentencing Commission had advanced through commentary.23
The sentencing guideline applicable to Mr. Nieves’s underlying offense of
aiding and abetting a convicted felon in the possession of a firearm provided for
a variety of prior offense enhancements where “the defendant committed any
part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one [or more] felony
conviction[s] of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”24
Commentary to this guideline defined the term “controlled substance offense”
18
United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
19
See, e.g., United States v. Havis (Havis I), 907 F.3d 439, 450 (Thapar, J., concurring) (“Were this a
civil case, these problems with Auer deference would merit close attention. But as this is a criminal case, and
applying Auer would extend Havis’s time in prison, alarm bells should be going off.”), vacated by reh’g en banc,
921 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2019).
20
See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1575 (2019) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari that
asked the Supreme Court to revisit the application of Auer deference in the sentencing context).
21
Compare infra note 54 (describing how the composition of the Sentencing Commission was originally
envisioned), with Carrie Johnson, Trump Pick for Sentencing Commission Has History of Racially Charged
Remarks, NPR (Mar. 2, 2018, 12:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/02/590236153/trump-pick-for-sentencingcommission-has-history-of-racially-charged-remarks (criticizing a nominee to the Sentencing Commission for
holding views on sentencing policy that are out of the mainstream), and infra note 314 (illustrating the modern
composition of the Sentencing Commission).
22
See United States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2017); 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL,
supra note 3, § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
23
Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 9. Commentary is the text in the Guidelines Manual that is eligible for
Auer deference. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual
that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or federal statute, or is
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”); see also 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 3, § 1B1.7 (noting that commentary accompanies the guidelines sections to “interpret . . . or explain [how
they] are to be applied”).
24
2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
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by referring to another guideline and the commentary that accompanied it.25
Significantly, the referenced guideline unambiguously provided that “the term
‘controlled substance offense’ mean[t] an offense under federal or state
law . . . that prohibit[ed] the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or
dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled
substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or
dispense.”26 Yet, the commentary purporting to interpret this guideline provided
for a much broader definition of the term “controlled substance offense,” which
included “the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to
commit such offenses.”27
When the court enhanced Mr. Nieves’s sentence, it specifically referenced
this commentary in concluding that his conviction for attempt to possess with
intent to distribute controlled substances was a “controlled substance offense.”28
The court paid no attention to the blatant ambiguity between the definition
provided by the sentencing guideline and the greatly expanded definition
provided by its commentary, even though the former did not include attempt
offenses like the prior conviction at issue.29 While this ambiguity might seem
insignificant on its face, it resulted in Mr. Nieves being sentenced to an
additional two years of imprisonment.30 And, in the aggregate, criminal
defendants are sentenced under this provision and other arbitrary provisions en
25
Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1 (“‘Controlled substance offense’ has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b)
and Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.”).
26
Id. § 4B1.2(b).
27
Id. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (emphasis added).
28
Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 9.
29
Id. Other circuit courts have rejected deference to this commentary provision, resulting in an intercircuit split. Compare Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 9 (citing the commentary provision approvingly), with United
States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding that the commentary provision impermissibly
expanded on the definition provided by the sentencing guidelines).
30
The presentence report found that the base offense level for Mr. Nieves’s crime of aiding and abetting
a convicted felon in the possession of a firearm was twenty-six, because (1) “the offense . . . involved a
semiautomatic firearm that [was] capable of accepting a large capacity magazine” and (2) Mr. Nieves had “at
least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” 2018 GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2K2.1(a)(1); see Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 7. The report “also applied a two-level
enhancement . . . because . . . [the] conviction was for conduct that involved five firearms, and applied a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility,” resulting “in a total adjusted offense level of [twenty-five].”
Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 7; see 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 2K2.1(b)(1), 3E1.1. Combined
with Mr. Nieves’s criminal history category, this produced a sentencing guidelines range of seventy to eightyseven months’ imprisonment. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 7. If Mr. Nieves’s conviction for attempt to possess
with intent to distribute controlled substances did not qualify as a controlled substance offense and everything
else remained the same, the sentencing guidelines range that would be produced is forty-six months to fiftyseven months’ imprisonment. See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, at ch. 5 pt. A. Thus, assuming that
the judge would again sentence at the low end of the range, Mr. Nieves’s sentence would have been two years
shorter.
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masse,31 resulting in a system that drastically departs from the one that the
Sentencing Reform Act intended to create.32
This Comment focuses on the problems that arise at the intersection of Auer
deference and the sentencing guidelines and proposes a solution that (1) is
appropriately protective of the rights of criminal defendants and (2) retains the
necessary flexibility for the Sentencing Commission, allowing it to act through
commentary when appropriate. To begin, Part I explores the background against
which Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Act’s
delegation of rulemaking authority to the Sentencing Commission. Part II tracks
the development of Auer deference from its origin in Bowles v. Seminole Rock
& Sand Co. to its reformulation as a multi-step test in Kisor v. Wilkie. Part III
then examines the intersection of the sentencing guidelines and Auer deference
and details the problems that have arisen, which indicate a need to change the
current sentencing regime. Finally, Part IV proposes that the multi-step test
provided by the Supreme Court in Kisor can accommodate a new understanding
of Auer deference that is appropriately protective of criminal defendants. As part
of this multi-step test, courts should strictly apply their interpretive tools and use
the rule of lenity to foreclose Auer deference to commentary when it is harmful
to criminal defendants. Such an approach would ensure that the Sentencing
Commission cannot act in a manner that is contrary to the interests of criminal
defendants without amending the sentencing guidelines themselves, while still
retaining a more limited role for commentary.
I.

THE SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE GUIDELINES MANUAL, AND THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

During Fiscal Year 2018, federal district courts “reported 69,425 felony and
Class A misdemeanor cases to the [United States Sentencing] Commission,”
with “75.0 percent of all offenders receiv[ing] sentences” under the Guidelines
Manual.33 When criminal offenders appealed their sentences, 71.3% of their
sentences were affirmed outright while only 10.8% of their sentences were

31
In 2019, 1,737 offenders (2.5% of all offenders sentenced) were found to be career offenders under the
definitions set forth in this provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT
AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 77 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.
pdf.
32
See infra Part I.
33
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8, 84 tbl.29. A sentence under the Guidelines Manual is one
that is “within the applicable guidelines range, or . . . outside the applicable guidelines range [with] the court
cit[ing] a departure reason from the Guidelines Manual.” Id. at 8.
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reversed,34 reflecting the influential position that the Sentencing Commission
and its Guidelines Manual occupy at the center of the federal criminal justice
system.35 This Part begins by examining the traditional discretion exercised by
federal district court judges in sentencing and the movement toward uniformity
in sentencing that arose from problems inherent in this pre-guidelines system.
This Part then discusses the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which
(1) established the Sentencing Commission and (2) delegated it the authority to
promulgate federal sentencing policy. Finally, this Part explores how the
Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines Manual operate today.
A. The Movement Toward Sentencing Reform
Before federal sentencing was done in accordance with the Guidelines
Manual, sentencing disparities abounded in the federal criminal justice system,
which led Congress, the United States Parole Commission, and federal judges
to call for reform.36 Historically, federal district court judges employed
indiscriminate sentencing in criminal cases, in which criminal statutes provided
“the penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide
discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how
long, whether he should be fined and how much, and whether some lesser
restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or
fine.”37 The discretion that federal district court judges enjoyed under
indiscriminate sentencing was so broad that reviewing courts afforded almost
“unconditional deference [to the sentencing judge] on appeal.”38 As a result,
serious sentencing disparities were widespread39 and arose from differences in

34

Id. at 180.
See Anjelica Cappellino & John Meringolo, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Pursuit of Fair
and Just Sentences, 77 ALBANY L. REV. 771, 771–73 (2013) (discussing the recent growth in the size of the
federal prison system and the role that the Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines Manual has played in this
growth).
36
See infra notes 48–55. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973) (proposing a system of mandatory sentencing guidelines to limit sentencing disparities and
arbitrariness in sentencing).
37
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
38
Id. at 364. Judge Frankel, a reform-minded district court judge in the Southern District of New York,
remarked that “[t]he sentencing powers of the judges are . . . so far unconfined that . . . they are effectively
subject to no law at all.” FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 11.
39
Mistretta, 486 U.S. at 365; see Stephen G. Breyer, The Original U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and
Suggestions for a Fairer Future, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 799, 800 (2018); Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu,
The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission, 1985–1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1177–
81 (2017).
35
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the sentencing judge, the geographic location of the court,40 and “demographic
factors, particularly race and gender,” among other things.41
Disparities in “federal sentencing at the ‘front-end’ of the process were
exacerbated by the intervening actions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the
Parole Commission at the ‘back end’ of the process.”42 The Bureau of Prisons
governed good time allowances in prison, under which “federal prisoners were
able to . . . significantly reduce the length of time [that they] served relative to
the term of imprisonment imposed by federal district courts.”43 Independently
from the good time allowances, “the Parole Commission reviewed prison
sentences of federal offenders that exceeded one year and decided whether to
exercise its discretion to release them from prison at some point before the
expiration of the sentences imposed.”44 Because most prisoners became eligible
for parole “after they had served one-third of the[ir] prison sentence,”45 some
sentencing judges imposed longer sentences on the assumption that parole
would be granted and lessen the sentence, leading to sentencing disparities
between judges.46 As such, sentencing disparities at the trial level were inherent
in the pre-guidelines system and exacerbated through the actions of the Bureau
of Prisons and the Parole Commission.47
40
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1177–81. A study of sentencing in the Second Circuit asked judges
to sentence hypothetical criminal defendants based on uniform materials and revealed both intra-circuit and
intra-district discrepancies in sentencing. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 6–7,
26–31 (1974), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/2dCrStdy.pdf. For example, the median punishment
imposed in the first case of the study “was 10 years’ imprisonment and a $50,000 fine, [with] sentence[es]
rang[ing] from 3 years’ imprisonment to 20 years’ imprisonment and a $65,000 fine.” Id. at 5. A later Department
of Justice study involving 208 judges confirmed “the sentencing disparities identified in the Second Circuit
Study.” Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1179.
41
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1180 nn.83–84 (summarizing studies on race- and gender-based
sentencing disparities prior to the promulgation of the Guidelines Manual). Sentencing disparities often
compounded when demographic factors overlapped. See, e.g., Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. Just. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 661, 663 (1987) (statement of Ilene H.
Nagel, Comm’r, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n) (“[B]lack defendants convicted and sentenced for bank robbery in
jurisdictions in the South are likely to actually serve approximately thirteen months longer than similarly situated
bank robbers convicted and sentenced in other regions.”).
42
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1170.
43
Id. In some cases, good time allowances reduced a federal prisoner’s sentence to half that imposed by
the sentencing judge. Id. at 1170–71.
44
Id. at 1171. Parole functioned “as an integral part of . . . the indeterminate sentencing system [and was]
based on the theory that prison rehabilitated offenders, [which allowed] their reentry into the community well
before the expiration” of the sentence imposed. Id. But rehabilitation as a theory for punishment has been
frequently criticized. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 86–102; Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in
Sentencing, 41 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 29–40 (1972).
45
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1171.
46
See Breyer, supra note 39, at 800.
47
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1169–75.
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Recognizing the need for change, Congress, the Parole Commission, and
members of the judiciary took actions to mitigate the problematic roles that they
played in the sentencing regime. In 1958, Congress authorized the convening of
sentencing institutes “for the purpose of studying, discussing, and formulating
the objectives, policies, standards, and criteria for sentencing those convicted of
crimes and offenses in the courts of the United States,”48 and, in 1973, the Parole
Commission attempted to reduce arbitrary sentencing disparities by adopting
“guidelines that established a ‘customary range’ of confinement.”49 Ultimately,
however, neither the sentencing institutes50 nor the parole guidelines had any
significant impact because neither did anything to moderate the trial judge’s
discretion in sentencing so long as the sentence imposed was within the statutory
range provided by Congress.51
More significant was a book written by Judge Marvin Frankel of the
Southern District of New York, which called attention to sentencing disparities
throughout the country52 and “urged Congress to create a commission charged
with the task of issuing a set of guidelines that would modestly limit the
extraordinarily broad discretion of federal sentencing judges.”53 Judge Frankel
proposed that Congress create a “commission [that] would be a permanent
agency responsible for (1) the study of sentencing, corrections, and parole;
(2) the formulation of laws and rules to which the studies pointed; and (3) the
actual enactment of rules, subject to traditional checks by Congress and the
courts.”54 While the impact of this book was not immediately felt, it was

48
Joint Resolution of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-752, 72 Stat. 845, § 1 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 334 (2012)); see Mistretta v. United States, 486 U.S. 361, 365 (1989); FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 61–
68.
49
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365 (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 391 (1980)).
Congress explicitly endorsed the parole guidelines in 1976 by passing the Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act. Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201–4218, repealed by
Joint Resolution of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027).
50
FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 63, 68; see also Mark Phillip Rabinowitz, Criminal Sentencing: An
Overview of Procedures and Alternatives, 45 MISS. L.J. 782, 792 (1974) (noting that sentencing institutes “occur
too infrequently, and have been said to be ineffective in changing philosophies of attending judges”).
51
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365–66; see supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
52
See generally FRANKEL, supra note 36 (describing the sentencing disparities inherent in pre-Guidelines
Manual system).
53
Jon O. Newman, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Good Idea Badly Implemented, 46 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 805, 805 (2018); see Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1184.
54
FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 119. As proposed, the Commission was to be composed of diverse groups
of people, including “lawyers, judges, penologists and criminologists,” as well as “sociologists, psychologists,
business people, artists, and . . . former or present prison inmates.” Id. at 120. Judge Frankel thought it was
important to include prisoners on the Commission, given that (1) “prison riots and other events” were sweeping
the nation at the time of his proposal, and (2) “[p]risoners [had] begun to appear in commissions of inquiry and
similar bodies.” Id.
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ultimately significant, as it “led to the convening of a seminar at the Yale Law
School . . . [which] prepared a draft bill that served as the model for what
became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.”55
B. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Origin of the Sentencing
Commission
Congress took a renewed interest in sentencing in the late 1970s and
proposed—for the first time—a “comprehensive bill [that] included the
establishment of a sentencing commission for the purpose of drafting sentencing
guidelines.”56 While several pieces of sentencing reform legislation were
introduced during this period, Congress did not ultimately attain the necessary
bipartisan support for such legislation until the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.57
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 drastically altered the existing system
of indiscriminate sentencing in three ways. First, the Act “rejected imprisonment
as a means of promoting [the] rehabilitation” of criminal offenders;58 instead,
sentencing was to promote retributive, deterrent, incapacitative, and educational
goals.59 Second, the Act abolished the Parole Commission and consolidated the
power that “the sentencing judge and the Parole Commission [exercised in
deciding] what punishment an offender should suffer” in a new body60—the
United States Sentencing Commission.61 Third, appellate review of sentencing
55
Newman, supra note 53, at 806; see PIERCE O’DONNELL, MICHAEL J. CHURGIN & DENNIS E. CURTIS,
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 96–134 (1977)
(publishing the draft bill); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 3–4 (1987), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelinesmanual/1987/manual-pdf/1987_Supplementary_Report_Initial_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf (discussing the workshops
that were convened and the draft bill that was produced).
56
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 55, at 4.
57
Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1184; see U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 55, at 5–6.
58
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(k); then citing 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). There was growing skepticism toward rehabilitation as a goal of criminal punishment
when the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was passed. See FRANKEL, supra note 36, at 86–102 (criticizing the
role that rehabilitation as a theory of punishment played in promoting indeterminate sentencing); NORA V.
DEMLEITNER, DOUGLAS A. BERMAN, MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY:
CASES, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 131–33 (4th ed. 2018) (describing the “[r]ise and fall of the rehabilitative
ideal”); Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1183 n.100 (summarizing social science research that concluded that
rehabilitation through imprisonment did not work).
59
§ 3553(a)(2). Today, the Guidelines Manual identifies “rehabilitation” as a “basic purpose of
punishment,” along with “deterrence, incapacitation, [and] just punishment.” 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 3, at ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
60
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367. Indeterminate sentencing was dramatically reduced through the elimination
of parole—now, prisoners could be released early only for good behavior. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a)–(b)).
61
As established, the Sentencing Commission was an independent commission housed in the judicial
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was limited to cases in which (1) the sentence imposed by the federal district
court judge was not within the range mandated by the sentencing guidelines, or
(2) the sentencing guidelines were incorrectly applied.62
Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the ability to promulgate
(1) “guidelines . . . for [the] use of a sentencing court in determining the
sentence to be imposed in a criminal case”63 and (2) “general policy statements
regarding [the] application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing
or . . . implementation.”64 Congress also required the Sentencing Commission to
establish categories of offenses65 and defendants66 that it could use to create
sentencing ranges “for each category of offense involving each category of
defendant.”67 Congress intended the end product of this process to be a matrix
of sentencing ranges that federal district court judges would use when

branch. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). The Commission was composed of “seven voting members and one nonvoting
member,” at least three of which had to be federal judges. Id. Other provisions of the Act specified appointment
and removal provisions and imposed limitations on the Commission’s political composition. Id. Notably, the
composition of the original Sentencing Commission did not resemble the composition initially proposed by
Judge Frankel, and resembles it even less so today. Compare About the Commissioners, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/commissioners (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) (describing the current composition of the
Sentencing Commission), with supra note 54 (describing Judge Frankel’s initial proposal for the composition of
the Sentencing Commission).
62
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)–(b)). A defendant was permitted to appeal their
sentence if the sentence exceeded the range set by the guidelines, while the Government was permitted to appeal
the sentence if it fell below the range set by the guidelines. § 3742 (a)–(b). Subsequent changes have been made
to this standard due to constitutional challenges. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
63
§ 994(a)(1). Initially, the sentencing guidelines were binding in nature. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367
(citing §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1)). Judges could depart from the guidelines only if there were mitigating or
aggravating factors that were not adequately considered by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. See § 3553(b)(1).
The Supreme Court, however, found that the binding nature of the sentencing guidelines was unconstitutional
in United States v. Booker. See infra notes 76–80 (discussing the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that
were modified following the decision in Booker).
64
§ 994(a)(2). While the “Sentencing Reform Act [did] not in express terms authorize the issuance of
commentary, the Act does refer to it.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 41 (1993); see also infra Part III.A
(discussing the function of commentary). Guidelines, commentary, and general policy statements are published
as part of the Guidelines Manual. See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, at ch.1, pt. A.
65
Categorization of offenses had to take into account (1) the grade of the offense, (2) the circumstances
mitigating or aggravating the seriousness of the offense, (3) the nature and degree of harm caused, (4) the
community view of the offense’s gravity, (5) the public’s concern with the offense, (6) the deterrent effect of the
sentence imposed, and (7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and nationally. § 994(c).
66
Categorization of defendants had to take into account (1) age, (2) education, (3) vocational skills,
(4) mental and emotional conditions as they mitigate defendant’s culpability, (5) physical condition (drug
dependency), (6) previous employment record, (7) family ties and responsibilities, (8) community ties, (9) the
defendant’s role in the offense, (10) criminal history, and (11) the degree of dependence upon criminal activity
for livelihood. § 994(d). However, a defendant’s “education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties
and responsibilities, and community ties” were generally inappropriate to consider. § 994(e).
67
§ 994(b)(1).
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determining criminal sentences.68 The ranges themselves were constrained by
the Act to those limits already provided by the underlying criminal statutes,69
with “[t]he maximum of the range [ordinarily] . . . not [to] exceed the minimum
of that range by more than the greater of 25% or six months.”70
While the Sentencing Reform Act was passed in 1984, the Sentencing
Commission did not promulgate the first Guidelines Manual until November
1987.71 Almost immediately afterward, litigation testing both the Sentencing
Commission and its Guidelines Manual began.72
C. Constitutional Challenges to the Sentencing Commission and the
Guidelines Manual
The constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission was challenged almost
immediately after the initial Guidelines Manual was promulgated in 1987,
though the Commission largely survived constitutional scrutiny.73 In Mistretta
v. United States, a criminal defendant argued that a sentence promulgated under
the guidelines was unconstitutional on the grounds that (1) “the Sentencing
Commission was constituted in violation of the established doctrine of
separation of powers,” and (2) “Congress delegated excessive authority to the
Commission to structure the [g]uidelines.”74 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
ultimately rejected both arguments and found that the Sentencing Commission
was constitutional in its entirety.75
Other constitutional challenges have been raised to individual sentencing
guidelines. However, the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing

68
See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1308. The matrices that the Sentencing Commission
promulgated stand in marked contrast to the simplicity of the grid adopted by the Federal Parole Guidelines. Id.;
see 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, at ch. 5, pt. A.
69
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 351, 368 (1989) (citation omitted).
70
§ 994(b)(2). The sentencing guidelines were not designed to be static, so Congress affirmatively tasked
the Sentencing Commission with periodically “review[ing] and revis[ing] . . . the guidelines [that it]
promulgated.” § 994(o). In the same vein, Congress affirmatively required the Commission to submit to
“Congress at least annually an analysis of the operation of the guidelines,” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 369 (citing
§ 994(w)), as well as any proposed “amendments to [the] guidelines and modifications to previously submitted
amendments that ha[d] not taken effect.” § 994(p). As a congressional check, proposed amendments and
modifications had to be submitted with explanation to Congress at least 180 days before the effective date of the
changes, during which time Congress could take action if warranted. Id.
71
See generally Newton & Sidhu, supra note 39, at 1183–1221 (describing the Sentencing Commission’s
earliest days and the three-year process of promulgating the initial Guidelines Manual).
72
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370.
73
See id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 412.
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Commission itself have largely survived constitutional scrutiny with one major
exception, namely that the provisions of the Act which made the sentencing
guidelines mandatory have been found unconstitutional.76 In United States v.
Booker, the Supreme Court found that the mandatory provisions of the
Sentencing Reform Act were unconstitutional because they violated the
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.77 The Court, however, determined that
those provisions that “ma[de] the [g]uidelines mandatory . . . [could] be severed
and excised,”78 and concluded that the guidelines could operate as “effectively
advisory” in their absence.79 Thus, today, sentencing courts are required “to
consider [the] [g]uidelines ranges,” but are permitted “to tailor the sentence in
light of other statutory concerns.”80
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the sentencing
guidelines in this new capacity.81 Nonetheless, what remains significant is that
(1) the sentencing guidelines are advisory in nature,82 and (2) sentences that are
imposed within the recommended sentencing guidelines range enjoy a
presumption of reasonableness on appeal.83

76

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005).
Id. at 232.
78
Id. at 245. The provisions that the Supreme Court excised are 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (“[T]he court
shall impose a sentence of that kind, and within the range . . . .”) and § 3742(e) (“[T]he court of appeals shall
review de novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”).
79
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. A data project conducted by the Sentencing Commission post-Booker
demonstrates the continued importance of the sentencing guidelines, even though they are no longer mandatory.
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT (2005), http://www.nhp.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/booker.pdf. In the period immediately after the decision in Booker, 61.9% of federal
sentences imposed fell within the sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines Manual, as compared to
64.5%, 64.0%, 65.0%, and 69.4% in in the years preceding the decision (2000–2003, respectively). Id. at 7–12.
Similarly, in 2018, “75.0 percent of all offenders received sentences under the Guidelines Manual, in that the
sentence was within the applicable guidelines range, or was outside the applicable guidelines range and the court
cited a departure reason from the Guidelines Manual.” U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8.
80
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46; see also Havis I, 907 F.3d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Though advisory,
the Guidelines and their commentary remain the ‘lodestone’ of federal sentencing.”), vacated by reh’g en banc,
921 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2019).
81
For a discussion of Supreme Court cases interpreting the new advisory nature of the sentencing
guidelines, see Jeff Papa & Chris Kashman, An Introduction to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 IND. L.
REV. 357, 365–66 (2018); Cappellino & Meringolo, supra note 35, at 780–83.
82
Booker, 543 U.S. at 226–27.
83
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (“[A] court of appeals may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines.”).
77
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II. DEFERENCE TO AN AGENCY’S INTERPRETATION OF ITS
OWN REGULATIONS
As highlighted by Mistretta,84 the congressional delegation of rulemaking
authority to agencies is commonplace, and such delegations are almost always
upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court.85 Importantly, these delegations
of rulemaking authority are accompanied by the presumption that federal
agencies are to be “the primary interpreters of ambiguous federal statutes” that
they have been charged by Congress to administer.86 Moreover, empirical data
reflects this presumption, as courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute
that it administers or a regulation that it has promulgated in the vast majority of
the cases in which a deference doctrine is invoked.87 This Part begins by
introducing Chevron deference and Auer deference, two of the most important
administrative deference doctrines. This Part then examines Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co. and Auer v. Robbins, which establish that courts should defer
to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless the interpretation is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (an administrative
deference doctrine now known as Auer deference).88 This Part concludes by
discussing criticisms of Auer deference and examining the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which upheld Auer deference but set forth a
new test for its application.89
A. An Introduction to Administrative Deference Doctrines
While congressional delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies are
commonplace,90 they do not put agency action beyond judicial review; instead,
84

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
See generally Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619 (2017) (contrasting the insignificance of the nondelegation doctrine at the federal
level with the vibrancy of the nondelegation doctrine at the state level); Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano,
The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (2017) (arguing that courts have never used
the nondelegation doctrine to substantively limit the delegation of legislative power).
86
Christopher J. Walker, Do Judicial Deference Doctrines Actually Matter?, LAW & LIBERTY (Aug. 25,
2016), https://www.lawliberty.org/2016/08/25/do-judicial-deference-doctrines-actually-matter/. This presumption is
reflected by the Administrative Procedure Act’s judicial review provisions. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706 (setting
forth the standards of review that courts use in evaluating agency action), with Walker, supra (highlighting
legislation that would alter § 706 and require courts to “decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including
the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies”).
87
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2008).
88
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414 (1945).
89
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414–18 (2019).
90
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
85
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the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs the exercise of rulemaking
authority by agencies and provides for judicial review of agency action.91 As
part of this judicial review, courts determine the “meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action,” allowing courts to determine whether they should
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions.”92 While
this language “could be read to ‘mean that all statutory ambiguities are to be
resolved judicially’ . . . [,] [a]dministrative law nonetheless recognizes that
agencies should often enjoy special sway over [the determination of] legal
meaning” in light of the agency’s expertise and the congressional delegation of
rulemaking authority.93
As a result, the Supreme Court has recognized several deference doctrines
that require courts to defer to an “agency’s construction of [a] statute (or
regulation) that it administers,” including Chevron deference and Auer
deference.94 Chevron deference applies when courts are determining whether an
agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers should receive deference.95
In making this determination, the court employs a two-step analysis.96 In
Chevron Step One, the court considers “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue” using the “traditional tools of statutory
construction.”97 Then, in Chevron Step Two, if the court determines that
Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” the court
looks to “whether the agency’s [interpretation] is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”98 The agency’s interpretation will receive
“controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute.”99

91

5 U.S.C. § 706.
Id.
93
4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.31 (3d ed.
2019) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
94
Id. See generally Eskridge & Baer, supra note 87, at 1097–1136 (2008) (summarizing deference
doctrines that the Supreme Court has applied over time).
95
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
96
Id. at 842–43.
97
Id. at 842–43, 843 n.9. While courts and scholars disagree on what the “traditional tools of statutory
construction are,” courts have, at various times, considered statutory text and structure, legislative history,
statutory purpose, and constitutionally inspired norms. See Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us
About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 618–19 (2014) (noting the murkiness
inherent in the phrase “traditional tools of statutory construction”); Frederick Liu, Chevron as a Doctrine of
Hard Cases, 66 ADMIN L. REV. 285, 289, 308–10 (2014) (identifying tools that courts have used as “traditional
tools of statutory construction”).
98
Chevron, 467 U.S at 843.
99
Id. at 844.
92
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Auer deference, on the other hand, applies when courts are determining
whether an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations should receive
deference.100 Under Auer deference, courts treat an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations as “controlling unless [the interpretation is] ‘plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.’”101 Significantly, the Supreme Court has
recognized that commentary contained in the Guidelines Manual is analogous
to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and may receive Auer
deference.102 Thus, an understanding of the doctrine’s origin, rationale, and
development is essential to understanding how the doctrine intersects with the
Guidelines Manual today—creating problems for criminal defendants.
B. Seminole Rock—The Origin of Deference to an Agency’s Interpretation of
Its Own Regulations
With little explanation, the Supreme Court announced for the first time in
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. that courts “must necessarily look to the
administrative construction of [a] regulation if the meaning of the words used
[in it] is in doubt.”103 The Supreme Court acknowledged that congressional
intent and constitutional principles may be relevant in choosing between
“various constructions” of an ambiguous regulation; however, it concluded that
“the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation[,] which becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”104 As such, the Supreme Court indicated that the “only tools”
available to reviewing courts in determining whether to grant deference to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations are “the plain words of the
regulation and any relevant [agency] interpretations.”105
Application of this doctrine was limited in nature following the Supreme
Court’s initial decision in Seminole Rock, though courts began to grant Seminole
Rock deference more frequently in the 1960s and 1970s.106 The doctrine largely
operated with an unenumerated rationale until the 1990s, when the Supreme
Court finally explained why “courts should extend strong deference to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.”107 In Martin v. Occupational
100

4 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 93.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
102
Stinson v. United States, 507 U.S. 36, 38, 45 (1993) (citations omitted).
103
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65
EMORY L.J. 47, 69, 91 (2015).
107
4 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 93, § 11.38.
101
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Safety & Health Review Commission, the Supreme Court explained that
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is proper “[b]ecause
applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls
upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives.”108 The
Court further explained that agencies have “historical familiarity and
policymaking expertise [that] account . . . for the presumption that Congress
delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than to the
reviewing court.”109 And, it was against this background that the Supreme Court
affirmed the validity of Seminole Rock deference in Auer v. Robbins, despite
some early criticism of the doctrine.110
C. Auer—Deference to an Agency’s Interpretation of Its Own Regulations
Under a Modern Rationale
While the application of Seminole Rock deference had been rapidly
expanding since the 1960s,111 the Supreme Court “provide[d] important
information regarding the potential scope of the doctrine” in Auer v. Robbins.112
At issue in Auer was an agency’s interpretation of a regulation that was
presented in an amicus brief filed by an agency official—something far different
from the interpretation that the Supreme Court had considered in Seminole
Rock.113 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded that, because the official’s
interpretation was a “creature of the [agency’s] own regulations, his
interpretation . . . [was] controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.’”114
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the official’s interpretation of the
regulation received deference because the “deferential standard [was] easily
met.”115 Challenges on the ground that the interpretation was asserted for the
first time in a legal brief were rejected by the Court.116 Importantly, the Court
found that the form of the interpretation itself did not “make it unworthy of
108
109
110

499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991); see 4 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 93, § 11.38.
Martin, 499 U.S. at 153.
See 1 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 353 (6th ed.

2019).
111

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
4 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 93, § 11.38.
113
See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). Interestingly, the amicus brief was filed at the request
of the court. Id. While the Supreme Court never explained why it requested that the official file an amicus brief
with his interpretation, it was presumably because of his “historical familiarity and policymaking expertise” with
the regulations and underlying statute. See Martin, 499 U.S. at 153.
114
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
115
Id.
116
See id. at 462.
112
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deference” in this case, because (1) the interpretation was “in no sense ‘a post
hoc rationalization’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency
action,” and (2) there was “no reason to suspect that the interpretation d[id] not
reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”117
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision in Auer affirmed that the deferential
standard originally set forth in Seminole Rock was valid, though it suggested that
there were some limits on the types of interpretations that would receive
deference.118 This decision served as the start of a new era for the doctrine, which
is reflected by the fact that courts now refer to the doctrine as Auer deference,
not Seminole Rock deference.119
D. Criticism of Auer Deference and Increased Skepticism Toward the
Doctrine
Courts and scholars largely accepted this deference doctrine as
uncontroversial after the Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole Rock,120 though
criticisms of the doctrine began to arise in the 1990s.121 After the Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the doctrine in Auer, however, criticism was largely
quelled (at least until the early 2010s).122 At that time, the Supreme Court again
took “note of the doctrinal concerns inherent in the Seminole Rock deference
regime,”123 with renewed scholarly attention soon to follow.
1. Early Criticism of Seminole Rock Deference
In the period before the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Auer,
members of the judiciary began to raise concerns with the application of
117

Id.
See id. at 461–62.
119
See 1 HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 110, at 353; 4 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 93, § 11.38.
Hereafter, the doctrine will be referred to as Seminole Rock deference if the opinion or scholarship was written
before Auer, and Auer deference if the opinion or scholarship was written after Auer.
120
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414; see supra Part II.B. Most of the academic
commentary on Seminole Rock deference arose from one scholar, who “argued that courts should generally
accept an agency’s reasonable, consistently applied interpretation of its own regulations.” John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
612, 614 n.12 (1996).
121
See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 102 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Manning, supra note 120; Robert
A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 1
(1996).
122
See infra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
123
Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of the Seminole Rock Deference
Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 791 (2014).
118
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Seminole Rock deference and its underlying rationale, though this criticism was
limited.124 More importantly, scholars began to critique Seminole Rock
deference on the grounds that it (1) circumvented the requirements of the APA
and (2) threatened constitutional separation-of-powers requirements.125 These
criticisms retain significance today and merit an examination because members
of the judiciary have repeated these criticisms of Auer deference—ultimately
setting the stage for the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie.126
In this early period, scholars challenged that Seminole Rock deference
circumvented the requirements of the APA by (1) enforcing interpretations that
were promulgated outside the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking
and (2) disregarding the provisions for judicial review.127 Generally, the APA
requires agencies to comply with the requirements of notice-and-comment
rulemaking when they promulgate regulations under delegated rulemaking
authority.128An exception to these requirements exists, however, for
“interpretative rules.”129An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations would
presumably fall within this exception, but courts routinely fail to ask if the
interpretation at issue “genuinely interprets the regulation.”130 And, importantly,
this failure poses the danger that interpretations that do not actually interpret will
“acquire binding force [under this exception] while remaining cut off from
congressional intent, . . . the APA requirements, and . . . meaningful judicial
control.”131 An argument was also made that courts shirk their duty to
“determine the meaning . . . of the terms of an agency action”—as required by
the judicial review provisions of the APA—when they grant Seminole Rock
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.132
124
See Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 102 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512
U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For example, in Thomas Jefferson University, Justice Thomas noted that
Seminole Rock deference incentivized the promulgation of vague regulations and contravened the requirement
that agencies make their rules and regulations sufficiently clear, so that “affected parties have adequate notice
concerning the agency’s understanding of the law.” 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125
See generally Anthony, supra note 121 (discussing APA-based criticisms of Seminole Rock deference);
Manning, supra note 120 (discussing the ways in which Seminole Rock deference threatens constitutional
separation-of-powers arguments).
126
See infra Part II.E.
127
See Anthony, supra note 121, at 4–12; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706 (setting forth the requirements of
notice-and-comment rulemaking and the provisions for judicial review, respectively).
128
§ 553. To satisfy the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking, agencies must publish a notice
in the Federal Register that contains “(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.” Id.
129
Id.
130
Anthony, supra note 121, at 6.
131
Id. at 8.
132
§ 706; see Anthony, supra note 121, at 89. This view holds that “it is wrong for courts to abdicate their
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Scholars also challenged that Seminole Rock deference threatened
constitutional separation-of-powers requirements by undermining (1) the due
process requirements of notice and (2) external political controls on agencies.133
Scholars argued that the due process requirement of notice is undermined when
courts allow “agencies to adopt imprecise or indeterminate regulations” and
grant Seminole Rock deference to later interpretations, as this binds “courts and
the public to improbable or hard-to-predict constructions of [an agency’s]
regulations.”134 They also contended that Seminole Rock deference undermined
external political controls on agencies by accumulating “rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudicative authority in the typical administrative agency,”135
which made it much “easier for agencies to use ambiguous or vague language to
conceal regulatory outcomes that benefit small interest groups at the expense of
the public at large.”136
Despite these early criticisms of Seminole Rock deference, the Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed the vitality of the doctrine in Auer v. Robbins.137
And, while criticism was largely quelled in the wake of this decision, the
Supreme Court138 and scholars139 took renewed interest in critiquing the doctrine
office of determining the meaning of agency regulation and submissively giv[ing] controlling effect to a notinconsistent agency position,” which is what courts do when they grant Auer deference. Anthony, supra note
121, at 9. By granting Auer deference, courts allow agencies to “issue self-serving interpretations with
impunity[,] . . . [that] will have at least as much binding force as the regulation,” so long as the interpretation is
not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. at 10.
133
Manning, supra note 120, at 654–80.
134
Id. at 669. Due process requires that “legal rules . . . give persons of ‘ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that [they] may act accordingly.” Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). But, granting Seminole Rock deference to imprecise or indeterminate
regulations could result in interpretations that “would not be obvious to ‘the most astute reader’” or “diverge
significantly from what a first-time reader of the regulations might conclude was the ‘best’ interpretation of the
language.” Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
135
Id. at 675. Typical political constraints on the administrative process include legislative appropriations
and confirmations (legislative), and the powers of appointment, removal, and regulatory oversight (executive).
See id. at 675–76 nn.301–05.
136
Id. at 676–77. The imprecise and misleading rulemaking that Seminole Rock deference incentivizes
may “mak[e] it more costly for the political system to detect, and assign, responsibility for political bargains that
benefit the few at the expense of the many.” Id. at 678.
137
See supra Part II.C.
138
For a discussion of cases in which members of the Supreme Court questioned Auer deference, see
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Evasions, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 24–26 (2018); Cynthia Barmore,
Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 813, 821–25 (2015); Leske, supra note 123, at
796–800.
139
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 103 (2019) (arguing that the practical rationale for Auer deference is undermined as the standard
becomes more difficult to apply); Adler, supra note 138 (arguing that Auer deference allows agencies to evade
the constraints that are placed upon agency behavior); Jefferey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16
GEO J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87 (2018) (arguing that Auer deference is grounded in a misunderstanding of Bowles v.
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in the early 2010s, ultimately leading the Supreme Court to reconsider Auer
deference in Kisor v. Wilkie.140
2. Growing Discontent: The March Toward Kisor
Justice Scalia became the first member of the Supreme Court to openly
question the merits of Auer deference in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell
Telephone Co., decided in 2011.141 Justice Scalia opined that he had “become
increasingly doubtful of [the] validity” of Auer deference, even though he had
“uncritically accepted that rule” in the past.142 Justice Scalia also noted his belief
that Auer deference “encourages the agency to enact vague rules[,] . . . frustrates
the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary
government.”143 As such, Justice Scalia indicated that he would “be receptive”
to reconsidering Auer deference in the future.144
Next, the Supreme Court refused to grant Auer deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
decided in 2012.145 This decision was significant, as it presented “a rare case
where the Court declined” to grant deference to the agency.146 The Court began
its decision by defining the scope of the deference doctrine as it had developed
in Auer and subsequent decisions,147 before highlighting the criticisms of the
doctrine as set forth by Justice Scalia in his Talk America concurrence.148 The
Court then concluded that granting Auer deference to the agency’s interpretation
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.); Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Lessons from the Lost History of
Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 647 (2015) (arguing that Seminole Rock deference has expanded from
its constitutional origins without an adequate explanation by courts and other commentators); Leske, supra note
123 (identifying substantial differences in the applications of Auer deference by the circuit courts).
140
See infra Part II.E.
141
564 U.S. 50, 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
142
Id. Interestingly, Justice Scalia authored the unanimous opinion in Auer, though he later became
sharply critical of Auer deference and described it as “one of the Court’s ‘worst decisions ever.’” Clarence
Thomas, A Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 126 YALE L.J. 1600, 1603 (2017).
143
Talk Am., 564 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring).
144
Id.
145
567 U.S. 142, 155–61 (2012).
146
Leske, supra note 123, at 798.
147
SmithKline Beacham, 567 U.S. at 155. Previously, the Court made clear that interpretations cannot be
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,
414 (1945), and must “reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). Moreover, an agency’s interpretation will not be “fair and considered,” and
cannot receive Auer deference, when the interpretation (1) “conflicts with a prior interpretation,” Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994), (2) serves only as the agency’s “convenient litigating
position,” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988), or (3) is “a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’
advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
148
See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
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in this case would “seriously undermine the principle that agencies should
provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or
requires.’”149
After these early decisions in Talk America and SmithKline Beecham, the
Supreme Court began to seriously question the validity of the deference doctrine
in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, decided in 2013.150
Opposition to Auer deference began to climax in Decker, as Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito indicated their willingness to reconsider the doctrine
for the first time, and Justice Scalia continued his forceful critiques.151 Similar
to his concurrence in Talk America, Justice Scalia authored an opinion in which
he critiqued Auer deference on separation-of-powers grounds, though he did so
in much stronger terms than he had previously used.152 But, more significantly,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito indicated in a concurrence that it might
“be appropriate to reconsider” Auer deference “in an appropriate case,” before
concluding that “this [was] not that case.”153
Finally, in 2015, the Supreme Court cemented its interest in reconsidering
Auer deference in a series of concurring opinions authored by Justices Alito,
Scalia, and Thomas in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n.154 Like in Decker,
Justice Alito did not substantively critique Auer deference, but again opined that
he “await[ed] a case in which the validity” of it could be explored.155 To the
contrary, Justices Scalia and Thomas each offered substantive critiques of Auer
deference and openly called for its end.156

149
SmithKline Beacham, 567 U.S. at 156. The Court also highlighted the “threat posed by allowing
agenc[ies] to offer definitive interpretations of ‘vague and open-ended regulations’ long after the regulations
were first issued.” Adler, supra note 138, at 25 (quoting SmithKline Beacham, 567 U.S. at 158).
150
See Leske, supra note 123, at 798.
151
Decker v. Nw. Env’t. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 615 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia
authored a separate opinion in which he critiqued Auer deference. Id. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
152
See id.; Leske, supra note 123, at 799. In his opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that “[e]nough is
enough” and that Auer deference’s beneficial effects “cannot justify a rule that not only has no principled basis
but contravenes one of the great rules of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its
violation.” Decker, 568 U.S. at 616, 621 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153
Id. at 615 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
154
135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
155
Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
156
See id. at 1211–13 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (critiquing Auer deference on the ground
that it contravenes the APA); id. at 1213–25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (critiquing Auer deference
on the ground that it violates separation-of-powers principles); see also Barmore, supra note 138, at 824
(discussing the opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas in Perez).
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Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court’s divergent views as to the continued
vitality of Auer deference replicated themselves in the circuit courts.157 Despite
this confusion, however, lower courts continued to grant Auer deference to
agency interpretations in the vast majority of cases in which the doctrine was
raised.158 Thus, the Supreme Court ultimately agreed to reconsider Auer
deference in Kisor v. Wilkie, as there was (1) ongoing confusion regarding the
doctrine and (2) open hostility toward it by members of the Supreme Court,
lower court judges, and legal scholars.159
E. Kisor—A New Test Limiting the Scope of Auer Deference
Reflecting the conflict among members of the Supreme Court, lower court
judges, and administrative law scholars, the Supreme Court issued a series of
spirited opinions in Kisor v. Wilkie that addressed the future of Auer
deference.160 Most significantly, the Supreme Court enumerated a new multistep test161 for courts to use in determining whether Auer deference is

157
See generally Hickman & Thomson, supra note 139 (discussing Auer deference’s increased complexity
and the difficulties of the lower courts in applying it); Barmore, supra note 138, at 825–38 (identifying trends
among the circuit courts in their applications of Auer deference after the Supreme Court’s opinions in Talk
America, SmithKline Beacham, and Decker); Leske, supra note 123 (describing the ways in which the circuit
courts differed in applying Auer deference).
158
See generally Barmore, supra note 138 (presenting an empirical analysis of lower courts’ application
of Auer deference in the period after Talk America). After Talk America, lower courts granted deference to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations in 82.3% of the cases in which that question was presented, though
this percentage decreased in the period between the Supreme Court’s decisions in SmithKline Beacham and
Decker, and in the period since Decker. Id. at 828.
159
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2430–31 nn.37–39 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
On numerous occasions, lower court judges explicitly called for the Supreme Court to reconsider Auer deference.
See, e.g., Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221, 230 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Auer’s hours seem numbered.”); Havis
I, 907 F.3d 439, 450 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring) (“If there was ever a case to question deference to
administrative agencies under Auer v. Robbins, . . . or more specifically to the Sentencing Commission under
the Auer-like Stinson v. United States, . . . this is it.”), vacated by reh’g en banc, 921 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2019);
Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 279 (3d Cir. 2017) (“As though that were not bad enough, our
hands are also tied when an agency interprets or reinterprets its own rules. Those fetters were put in place by
Auer v. Robbins.”).
160
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400.
161
The Supreme Court has never explicitly stated how many steps the new test for Auer deference has,
though some scholars have proposed that there are as many as five. See., e.g., Christopher J. Walker, What Kisor
Means for the Future of Auer Deference: The New Five-Step Kisor Deference Doctrine, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (June 26, 2019), https://yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-for-the-future-of-auerdeference-the-new-five-step-kisor-deference-doctrine/. This Comment is primarily concerned with Step One and
Step Two of the new test and lumps the remaining factors together as Step Three.
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warranted162—a tool that courts can use in the sentencing context to limit the
detrimental effects of Auer deference.163
First, “a court should not afford Auer deference” to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation “unless the regulation [at issue] is genuinely
ambiguous.”164 If there is no uncertainty as to the meaning of a regulation, then
there is no “plausible reason” for courts to grant deference to the agency.165 In
“concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the
‘traditional tools’ of construction.”166 This effort entails a court carefully
considering “the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the
ways it would if it had no agency to fall back on.”167 When courts undertake this
process, “many seeming ambiguities” will be resolved without courts having to
resort to Auer deference.168
Second, “the agency’s reading” of a genuinely ambiguous regulation “must
still be ‘reasonable.’”169 Agencies can fail this requirement, and “[u]nder Auer,
as under Chevron, the agency’s reading must fall ‘within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation,’”170 which are set by the regulation’s “text, structure,
history, and so forth.”171 Thus, even if a regulation turns “out to be truly
ambiguous” after the court has used its interpretive tools in Step One, application
of these tools still will have value in determining if the interpretation is
“reasonable” in Step Two.172
162
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–18. While the Supreme Court appeared to split on Auer deference based on
political ideology, an empirical analysis of lower courts’ application of Auer deference indicates that “[t]here is
little evidence that political ideology plays a role” in a court’s decision to grant or deny deference. Barmore,
supra note 138, at 833–34.
163
See supra Part III.B.
164
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court “expressly adopt[ed] Chevron step
one for Auer deference.” Walker, supra note 161.
165
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
166
Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
167
Id. (citation omitted).
168
Id. (emphasis added).
169
Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)). Again, the Supreme Court
expressly adopted Chevron Step Two. Walker, supra note 161.
170
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (citation omitted). Some scholars have suggested that “Chevron step two in
the circuits has largely been a nonfactor.” Walker, supra note 161; see also Kent Barnett & Christopher J.
Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (“Of the 70.0% of the interpretations that
moved to Chevron step two . . . , the agency prevailed 93.8% of the time.”). Nonetheless, a stronger Chevron
Step Two, such as that advocated by Justice Kagan elsewhere, has been embraced by some circuit courts. See
generally Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441
(2018) (discussing the ways in which “circuit courts have applied Chevron step two to invalidate agency
statutory interpretations”).
171
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
172
Id.
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Third, “a court must make an independent inquiry into whether the character
and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”173 As
part of this inquiry, the interpretation in question must be “the agency’s
‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’ rather than any more ad hoc statement not
reflecting the agency’s views.”174 Additionally, “the agency’s interpretation
must in some way implicate its substantive experience,” as this is part of the
rationale underlying the delegation of interpretive authority.175 Finally, the
agency’s interpretation of the rule “must reflect ‘fair and considered judgment’
to receive Auer deference.”176 So, “convenient litigating position[s]” and “post
hoc rationalization[s] advanced . . . to defend past agency action against attack”
will not qualify for Auer deference.177
At bottom, an agency will receive deference only when the underlying
regulation is genuinely ambiguous, and its interpretation is reasonable and of the
“character and context . . . [that] entitles it to controlling weight.”178 Thus,
“[w]hat emerges is a deference doctrine not quite so tame as some might hope,
but not nearly so menacing as they might fear.”179
In a lengthy concurrence, Justice Gorsuch vigorously objected to the Court’s
characterization of Auer deference and the Court’s rejection of challenges to the
doctrine.180 Justice Gorsuch’s opinion largely mirrored the structure of the
Court’s opinion and explored the concerns traditionally raised by courts and
scholars regarding the use of Auer deference.181 Most significant, however, was
173
Id. (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)). Notably, the Supreme Court
departs from the test for Chevron deference in this step, instead relying on its Auer deference jurisprudence. See,
e.g., supra note 147.
174
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (citation omitted). There is no requirement that the interpretation come from
the “Secretary [of the agency] or his chief advisers”; instead, the agency’s interpretation only has to “emanate
from those actors, using those vehicles, understood to make authoritative policy in the relevant context.” Id.
(citations omitted).
175
Id. at 2417. Without any substantive experience, “Congress presumably would not grant it that
authority.” Id.
176
Id. (citing SmithKline Beacham, 567 U.S. at 155).
177
Id. (citing SmithKline Beacham, 567 U.S. at 155).
178
Id. at 2416.
179
Id. at 2418. A plurality of the Supreme Court rejected challenges to Auer deference that were based on
the APA and broader policy concerns. Id. at 2418–22 (plurality opinion). The Court first rejected the APA-based
arguments that Auer deference (1) is “inconsistent with the judicial review provision of the [APA]” and
(2) “circumvents the APA’s rulemaking requirements.” Id. at 2418–20. The Court then rejected the policy-based
arguments that Auer deference (1) “encourages agencies to issue vague and open-ended regulations” and
(b) “violates ‘separation of powers principles.’” Id. at 2421–22. The Court also rejected the petitioner’s
arguments on stare decisis grounds. See id. at 2422.
180
Id. at 2425–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
181
Id. at 2425–43, 2430–2431 nn.37–39. While most of his objections were familiar, Justice Gorsuch did
offer a unique objection to Auer deference on the ground that it was inconsistent with Section 706 of the APA.
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Justice Gorsuch’s prediction that the Supreme Court’s “remodel[ing] [of] Auer’s
rule into a multi-step, multi-factor inquiry . . . leaves Auer so riddled with holes
that . . . courts may find that it does not constrain their independent judgment
any more than Skidmore.”182 Given that Auer deference now “requires courts to
exhaust all the traditional tools of construction” before deference is even
considered, Justice Gorsuch concluded that courts “will rarely, if ever, have to
defer to an agency regulatory interpretation that differs from what they believe
is the best and fairest reading.”183
In a similar strain, Justice Kavanaugh noted in a concurrence that an
application of “all the traditional tools of construction . . . will almost always
reach a conclusion about the best interpretation of the regulation at issue,”
leaving courts “no need to adopt or defer to an agency’s contrary
interpretation.”184 Thus, strict application of the traditional tools of statutory
construction will almost always allow a reviewing court to avoid granting Auer
deference.185
While the limited scholarly writing after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kisor suggests that the bounds of Auer deference are far from settled,186 the new
Id. at 2433. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court
held that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to
Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.” 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). In light of the
holding in Brand X, Justice Gorsuch argued that “courts have interpreted Auer as forbidding a court from ever
‘determin[ing] the meaning’ of a regulation with the force that normally attaches to precedent, because an agency
is always free to adopt a different view and insist on judicial deference to its new judgment.” Kisor, 139 S. Ct.
at 2433 (citations omitted). For a more detailed discussion of this objection, see Sasha Volokh, Auer Deference
and the Brand X Problem, REASON.COM: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://reason.com/
2019/06/26/auer-deference-and-the-brand-x-problem/.
182
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2447–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). Skidmore deference applies
when courts are determining whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute that lacks the force of law receives
deference. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Under Skidmore deference, an interpretation
receives deference only to the extent of the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power
to persuade.” Id.
183
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Roberts made a
similar point in his concurrence and indicated that there is great overlap between “cases in which Auer deference
is warranted . . . [and] cases in which it would be unreasonable for a court not to be persuaded by an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation.” Id. at 2424–25 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part). That is, because
of the commonalities between Auer deference, as championed by Justice Kagan, and Skidmore deference, as
championed by Justice Gorsuch, there are few circumstances in which application of one instead of the other
would have a substantive impact on the outcome of a case. Id.
184
Id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment).
185
Id. at 2448–49.
186
See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Baseball, Legal Doctrines, and Judicial Deference to an Agency’s
Interpretation of the Law: Kisor v. Wilkie, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 69, 74 (2018–2019) (noting that “[s]ome
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test articulated provides courts a toolkit that they can and should use in some
cases to avoid granting deference to an agency’s interpretations of its own
regulations.187 In the sentencing context, it is particularly advisable that courts
make full use of the new multi-factor test to avoid granting Auer deference to
commentary that interprets the sentencing guidelines in a manner that is contrary
to the interests of criminal defendants.188
III. THE INTERSECTION OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
AUER DEFERENCE
While administrative law and criminal law have traditionally been viewed
as two spheres that exist separate from one another, they do overlap in one
important manner, namely that Auer deference plays a substantial role in
criminal sentencing.189 And, the “alarm bells should be going off” regarding this
interaction, because the use of Auer deference in the sentencing context poses
problems far and above those posed in the administrative context more
generally—deference might be granted at the expense of a criminal defendant’s
liberty.190 This Part begins by examining the Supreme Court’s decision in
Stinson v. United States, which held for the first time that Auer deference applies
to the Guidelines Manual’s commentary. This Part then highlights the unique
problems that are created for criminal defendants when courts grant Auer
deference to such commentary.

scholars lament the lost opportunity to rein in some of the excesses of the regulatory state . . . [while] [o]thers
take heart from the numerous limitations that the Court placed on what henceforth should be known as the Kisor
deference doctrine”); Jonathan H. Adler, Auer Deference Post-Kisor, REASON.COM: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July
31, 2019, 7:44 PM), https://reason.com/2019/07/31/auer-deference-post-kisor/ (discussing an early difficulty
faced by a circuit court in working within the confines of the new Auer regime); Daniel E. Walters, A Turning
Point in the Deference Wars, REG. REV. (July 9, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/09/waltersturning-point-deference-wars/ (arguing that “the decision is . . . a restatement of existing law”); Michael Herz,
In “Gundy II,” Auer Survives by a Vote of 4.6 to 4.4, SCOTUS BLOG (June 27, 2019, 11:30 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/symposium-in-gundy-ii-auer-survives-by-a-vote-of-4-6-to-4-4/ (arguing
that the Supreme Court expressed an anti-deferential view in the opinion); see also Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]his case hardly promises to be this Court’s last word on Auer. If
today’s opinion ends up reducing Auer to the role of a tin god—officious, but ultimately powerless—then a
future Court should candidly admit as much and stop requiring litigants and lower courts to pay token homage
to it. Alternatively, if Auer proves more resilient, this Court should reassert its responsibility to say what the law
is and afford the people the neutral forum for their disputes that they expect and deserve.”).
187
See infra Part IV.
188
See infra Part III.
189
See Andrew Hessick, Auer, Mead, and Sentencing, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 15,
2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/auer-mead-and-sentencing/. Auer deference, however, is not used to “determine[e]
whether a substantive criminal violation has occurred.” Id.
190
Havis I, 907 F.3d 439, 450 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring), vacated by reh’g en banc, 921 F.3d
628 (6th Cir. 2019).
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A. Stinson—The Applicability of Auer Deference to the Guidelines Manual’s
Commentary
Although the application of Auer deference was initially limited to “the
context of traditional agency regulations,”191 the Supreme Court greatly
expanded its application by applying it to criminal sentencing in Stinson v.
United States.192 At issue in Stinson were the career offender provisions of the
Guidelines Manual, which enhance the sentences of persons that have
previously been convicted of certain crimes.193 The Sentencing Commission had
amended the commentary to the career offender provisions after the Eleventh
Circuit decided a criminal defendant’s initial appeal, prompting the defendant to
file a petition for rehearing.194 The Eleventh Circuit subsequently denied this
petition and adhered to its earlier decision, because it found that the commentary
to the career offender provisions was of limited authority and not binding on the
court, even though it was persuasive.195
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the question was whether courts should
grant Auer deference to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretations of the
sentencing guidelines as published in the commentary.196 The Supreme Court
unequivocally answered this question in the affirmative, concluding that
commentary that “does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute . . . must
be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.’”197
In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court first determined that the
sentencing guidelines were analogous to legislative rules adopted by federal
agencies, because the guidelines are promulgated “by virtue of an express
191
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1214 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
192
508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993).
193
Id. at 38–39. The career offender provisions are designed to ensure that career offenders “receive a
sentence of imprisonment ‘at or near the maximum term authorized.’” 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note
3, § 4B1.1 cmt. background (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)). To qualify as a career offender, a criminal defendant
must meet several requirements, one of which is “that the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either
a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” Id. § 4B1.1. The criminal defendant in Stinson challenged
that the crime for which he was being sentenced did not meet this requirement. 508 U.S. at 39.
194
508 U.S. at 39. The amended commentary provided that “the term ‘crime of violence’ [did] not include
the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon,” the crime for which the defendant was being
sentenced. Id.; SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1–4B1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1992) [hereinafter
1992 GUIDELINES MANUAL]. This amendment stood in contrast to the decision of several circuit courts on the
same issue. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 39 n.1.
195
508 U.S. at 39.
196
Id. at 37–38.
197
Id. at 45 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
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congressional delegation of [rulemaking] authority” and subject to the
requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking.198 The Court then reasoned
that commentary is analogous to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations, because its “functional purpose . . . is to assist in the interpretation
and application of those rules, which are within the Commission’s particular
area of concern and expertise.”199 Therefore, because commentary is similar to
an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations, the Supreme Court concluded
that Auer deference to it may be appropriate.200
The Supreme Court also explained that this understanding of commentary
was “consistent with the role [that] the Sentencing Reform Act contemplate[d]
for the Sentencing Commission” for two reasons.201 First, the Supreme Court
reasoned that interpretations of the sentencing guidelines that are advanced in
commentary are likely to be the best reflection of how the Sentencing
Commission believes the guidelines should be applied.202 Because the
Commission drafts both the guidelines and the commentary, it is a safe
presumption that these interpretations are consistent with the Guidelines Manual
and the authorizing statute itself.203 Second, the Supreme Court reasoned that
“Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commission would periodically
review the work of the courts . . . [and] make whatever clarifying revisions to
the [g]uidelines [that] conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.”204 And, the
198
Id. at 44–45. The Supreme Court rejected the idea that commentary is analogous to “an agency’s
construction of a federal statute that it administers,” which would make it eligible for Chevron deference. Id. at
44. The Court explained that commentary, unlike a legislative rule, is “not the product of delegated authority for
rulemaking” and does not have to “yield to the clear meaning of a statute.” Id.
199
Id. at 45. The Supreme Court noted that an understanding of commentary as the agency’s authoritative
interpretation of a sentencing guideline conflicted with the Supreme Court’s own understanding of the
relationship between the two. Id. at 45–46. Commentary in the Guidelines Manual at the time that Stinson was
decided predicted that “courts will treat the commentary much like legislative history or other legal material that
helps determine the intent of a drafter.” 1992 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 194, § 1B1.7 cmt. This provision
was amended the year after Stinson was decided to reflect the central holding in the case. 2018 GUIDELINES
MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1B1.7 cmt.
200
Id.; see supra note 197 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court had a broader understanding of
commentary than the one embraced today. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44. The Court explained that “commentary
explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to how even unambiguous guidelines are to be applied
in practice.” Id. (emphasis added). Notably, this statement directly contradicts later limitations placed on Auer
deference by the Court. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (“[A] court should not afford
Auer deference unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous.”); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588
(“Auer deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous.”).
201
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 46 (citation omitted). Congress demonstrated this understanding by delegating to the Sentencing
Commission the affirmative statutory obligation to “‘periodically review and revise’ the guidelines in light of
its consultation with authorities on and representatives of the federal criminal justice system.” Id. at 45 (quoting
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Supreme Court noted that one way to make such clarifying revisions was to
amend the commentary, provided that “the guideline which the commentary
interpret[ed] [would] bear the construction.”205
Fundamentally, the decision in Stinson is significant in showing the lengths
to which the Supreme Court was willing to go to give authoritative weight to
commentary in the absence of congressional approval or adherence to the
requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking, even in the sentencing
context. Some courts, however, have recognized the dangers inherent in this
decision and have begun resisting the grant of Auer deference in the criminal
sentencing context206—something that is made easier with the new multi-step
inquiry that the Supreme Court set forth in Kisor.
B. Problems with Auer Deference in the Sentencing Context
Courts have long recognized that the sentencing guidelines “raise some of
the same concerns as substantive criminal law” because they “result in criminal
punishment.”207 Consequently, courts have limited the application of Auer
deference to the commentary itself—other statements of the Sentencing
Commission do not receive Auer deference.208 So, in theory, “potential criminals
can stick to reviewing the Guidelines Manual, which contains both [the]
guidelines and [the] commentary” to determine the criminal consequences of
their actions.209
But, in reality, potential criminals that only reviewed the Guidelines Manual
before committing a crime may not be sure of the criminal consequences of their
actions because courts differ so sharply in how they apply Auer deference to the

28 U.S.C. § 994(o)); see supra note 70.
205
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46. The Supreme Court also offered that “[a]mended commentary is binding on
the courts even though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior judicial constructions of a particular guideline
cannot prevent the Sentencing Commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation that satisfies” the
requirements of Auer deference. Id. The latter point was also addressed by the Supreme Court in the Chevron
context and raised by Justice Gorsuch in Kisor as an objection to Auer deference. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm.
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
206
See, e.g., infra note 223.
207
Hessick, supra note 189. For this reason, the sentencing guidelines are subject to some of the same
requirements as substantive criminal law. Id. First, the guidelines “must satisfy at least some of the heightened
notice requirements applied to criminal law.” Id. Second, the guidelines are limited by the ex post facto clause
and cannot be applied retroactively in a manner that disadvantages criminal defendants. Id. Third, the guidelines
cannot be overly vague. Id.
208
Id.
209
Id. Because Auer deference is only granted to commentary, potential criminals do not “hav[e] to review
everything the Commission says.” Id.
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commentary.210 Disparities in the application of Auer deference in the
administrative context more generally are problematic because they undermine
uniformity and consistency, resulting in a system where “the determination of a
regulation’s meaning could . . . differ depending on which circuit hears the
case.”211 However, disparities in the application of Auer deference in the
sentencing context substantially amplify these concerns because these
disparities can result in terms of imprisonment that greatly differ from one court
to the next,212 undermining the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act.213
As one example, courts sharply disagree on whether Auer deference should
be granted to the commentary that accompanies the career offender guidelines214
because they differ on whether the commentary impermissibly expands on the
underlying guidelines or actually interprets them.215 In United States v. Havis, a
sharply divided three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit issued four separate
opinions on the question of whether Auer deference was due to these
commentary provisions.216 The underlying guideline at issue in Havis defined a
“controlled substance offense” and did not include attempt offenses within that
definition, whereas the commentary to that guideline expanded the definition to
include attempt offenses.217 Given this disparity between the narrower definition
provided in the sentencing guideline itself and the broader definition given in
the commentary that purported to interpret the guideline, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the Sentencing Commission was impermissibly attempting to
expand the category of offenses that qualified a defendant for a sentencing
enhancement under the career offender guidelines.218
210
See, e.g., United States v. Havis (Havis II), 927 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (refusing to
grant deference to § 4B1.2’s commentary because the guideline will not bear the construction); Havis I, 907
F.3d 439, 442–43 (6th Cir. 2018) (granting deference to the § 4B1.2’s commentary because of earlier precedent),
vacated by reh’g en banc, 921 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082, 1091–92
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that § 4B1.2’s commentary impermissibly expanded the definition of a “controlled
substance offense” that was provided in the underlying guideline); United States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5,
9 (1st Cir. 2017) (granting deference to the expanded definition of a “controlled substance offense” presented in
§ 4B1.2). See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Defendant-Appellant, Allen v. United States, 139 S.
Ct. 1575 (2019) (No. 18-8265) (discussing intra- and inter-circuit splits in the grant of Auer deference to
commentary provisions).
211
Leske, supra note 123, at 832.
212
Havis I, 907 F.3d at 450 (Thapar, J., concurring) (“Were this a civil case, these problems with Auer
deference would merit close attention. But as this is a criminal case, and applying Auer would extend [the
defendant’s] time in prison, alarm bells should be going off.”).
213
2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, at ch. 1, pt. A; see supra Part I.
214
See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text.
215
See supra note 210.
216
Havis I, 907 F.3d 439.
217
Id. at 441–44; see supra note 26–27 and accompanying text.
218
Havis I, 907 F.3d at 443. For this change to be permissible, the Sentencing Commission would have
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Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit begrudgingly ruled against the criminal
defendant and denied his appeal on the ground that it was bound to its prior
precedent, which relied on the definition of a “controlled substance offense” that
was presented in the commentary.219 Despite this holding, the Sixth Circuit
highlighted the “problem . . . [that] arises when the [Sentencing] Commission
bypasses” the formal requirements for promulgating and amending the
sentencing guidelines “by adding offenses to the [g]uidelines through
commentary rather than amendment.”220 When commentary is amended, the
Sentencing Commission “does not have to give Congress a chance to review
[it] . . . nor must the Commission float commentary through notice and
comment,” unlike the guidelines themselves.221 The court also noted that Stinson
made clear that “the Commission may only use commentary to interpret the text
that is already there.”222 As such, the court indicated that the Commission “must
keep [g]uidelines text and . . . commentary, which are two different vehicles, in
their respective lanes” for the Commission to remain “in its proper constitutional
position,” though the court was ultimately unable to take any action to save the
criminal defendant in this case.223
Other courts, however, have reached the opposite conclusion regarding the
same commentary provisions.224 For example, in United States v. Nieves-

had to amend the underlying guideline to include attempt offenses in a manner that complied with the
requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking and congressional acquiescence. See 28 U.S.C. § 994. The
Sentencing Commission is currently taking this approach and has proposed an amendment that would move the
“attempt” language from § 4B1.2’s commentary to the guideline itself. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 43–49 (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/20181219_rf-proposed.pdf. However, the
Sentencing Commission currently lacks the necessary quorum to actually vote on this amendment. See infra note
314.
219
Havis I, 907 F.3d at 442.
220
Id. at 443.
221
Id. (citations omitted).
222
Id. The Court noted that “a comment that increases the range of conduct that the [g]uidelines cover has
[clearly] . . . taken things a step beyond interpretation.” Id. (citing United States v. Winstead, 89 F.3d 1082,
1090–91 (D.C. Cir. 2018); United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)).
223
Id. (citations omitted). Subsequently, on rehearing, the Sixth Circuit issued a per curiam opinion and
refused to grant Auer deference to the commentary provision, because it found that the commentary was plainly
inconsistent with the guideline that it purported to interpret. Havis II, 927 F.3d 382, 385–87 (6th Cir. 2019).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion and found that Auer deference should not be granted to the
commentary provisions that add “attempt” crimes when the underlying guidelines themselves do not include
them. See, e.g., Winstead, 890 F.3d at 1091–92; cf. United States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 53, 59–60 (1st Cir.
2016) (refusing to grant Auer deference to commentary that defined a “crime of violence” as including the crime
of unlawful possession of a firearm when the definition provided in the underlying guideline did not include this
crime); United States v. Bell, 840 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2016) (reaching the same result as Soto-Rivera in the
context of robbery).
224
See, e.g., United States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Lange, 862
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Borrero, the First Circuit concluded in a cursory opinion that the commentary
including “attempt” offenses merited Auer deference, which subjected the
criminal defendant to a prior offense enhancement that substantially increased
his sentence—nearly two years of imprisonment was added to the defendant’s
sentence.225 While the court recognized that the commentary to the guidelines is
not gospel, it concluded that the commentary provision including “attempt”
offenses was authoritative because (1) the circuit had previously treated it as
such, and (2) the commentary was not “arbitrary, unreasonable, inconsistent
with the guideline’s text, or contrary to law.”226
Thus, Auer deference to the Guidelines Manual’s commentary poses the
same threat of sentencing disparities and arbitrariness that the Sentencing
Reform Act was initially passed to remedy due to the circuit splits that have
developed regarding some commentary provisions.227 Moreover, the use of
commentary today drastically departs from that originally intended by Congress
and the Sentencing Commission.228 The Sentencing Reform Act itself did not
explicitly authorize the issuance of commentary,229 and the Guidelines Manual
predicted that courts would “treat the commentary much like legislative history
or other legal material that helps determine the intent of a drafter” when it was
originally published.230 As compared to this original vision, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Stinson greatly expanded the role of commentary. And the Supreme
Court even went so far as to explain that “commentary explains the guidelines
and provides concrete guidance as to how even unambiguous guidelines are to
be applied in practice,”231 an understanding that is plainly inconsistent with the
Court’s modern Auer jurisprudence.232
Stated simply, the Sentencing Commission’s use of commentary today is not
what the drafters of the Sentencing Reform Act intended; instead, commentary
has morphed into a tool that the Sentencing Commission has used and will
continue to use to harm criminal defendants. The new test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Kisor, however, can be used as tool by the courts to return

F.3d 1290, 1293–96 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1225–28 (10th Cir. 2017).
225
Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 9; see supra note 30 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit’s decision
in Nieves-Borrero is discussed in much greater detail in the Introduction.
226
Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d at 9.
227
See supra Part I.
228
See infra notes 229–32 and accompanying text.
229
The Act refers to commentary but does not explicitly authorize its issuance like it does the sentencing
guidelines and policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).
230
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.7 cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1987).
231
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993) (emphasis added).
232
See supra note 200.
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commentary to its proper place and embody the original goals of the Sentencing
Reform Act.
IV. A SOLUTION—USING THE NEW MULTI-FACTOR TEST FROM KISOR TO
LIMIT AUER DEFERENCE IN THE SENTENCING CONTEXT
As Justice Kavanaugh noted in his Kisor concurrence, “[i]f a reviewing court
employs all the traditional tools of construction, the court will almost always
reach a conclusion about the best interpretation of the regulation at issue.”233
And, when the tools of construction are used in this manner, courts will rarely
grant Auer deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation because
a regulation must be genuinely ambiguous after an application of these tools for
Auer deference to be appropriate.234
Thus, when guided by the policies underlying the Sentencing Reform Act, it
is clear that judges should strictly apply their interpretive tools and use the rule
of lenity when determining if the Guidelines Manual’s commentary should
receive Auer deference. So construed, the Sentencing Commission will be
substantially limited in its ability to use commentary as a tool that harms
criminal defendants in the absence of the protections provided by the Sentencing
Reform Act. To begin, this Part argues that the traditional interpretive tools,
including text, structure, history, and purpose, should be rigorously used by
courts to avoid finding ambiguity in the sentencing guidelines. This Part then
argues that the rule of lenity—often invoked in sentencing—should also be used
by courts to avoid finding ambiguity when the traditional interpretive tools do
not resolve any apparent ambiguity. Finally, this Part concludes by examining
the more limited role that commentary would play if judges utilize the above
approach, something that would benefit criminal defendants and society more
generally.
A. Text, Structure, History, and Purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines
In Step One of the Auer analysis, courts “should not afford Auer deference
unless the regulation [at issue] is genuinely ambiguous.”235 And, to reach the
conclusion that a regulation is “genuinely ambiguous,” courts must “exhaust all

233
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra
notes 184–85 and accompanying text.
234
See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–17; see supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text.
235
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
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the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.”236 Thus, only when these tools are
exhausted can a court find that Auer deference to an agency is appropriate.”237
Further, when the Supreme Court expressly adopted Step One of Chevron as
the first step of the Auer analysis in Kisor v. Wilkie, it imported the myriad tools
of statutory interpretation that courts have traditionally used as part of their
interpretive toolbox.238 This toolbox includes “a range of diverse but familiar
devices [of statutory interpretation], from analysis of statutory text, to
consideration of legislative history and purpose, to application of selected
canons of construction.”239 And, this toolbox appears to be “no different from
those [tools] used to apply statutes [more] generally,” which also “finds support
in other of the Court’s decisions.”240
That is not to say that courts agree entirely on what tools comprise the
traditional tools of statutory construction.241 Instead, there is a “growing debate
within the Court regarding the tools to be employed at Step One, [which] mirrors
the broader debate among the Justices regarding interpretive methods [more]

236
Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). “[O]nly when
[the court’s] legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive question still has no right answer can a judge conclude
that it is ‘more one of policy than of law,’” and an appropriate decision for the agency to make. Id. (quoting
Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991)).
237
Id.
238
See Walker, supra note 161.
239
Liu, supra note 97, at 308–09. See generally VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH
SERV., CHEVRON DEFERENCE: A PRIMER 14–15 (2017) (describing traditional tools used by courts in determining
the meaning of statutes and regulations); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons (pts. 1 & 2), 65 STAN.
L. REV. 901 (2013), 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) (discussing the knowledge and use of interpretive principles
by legislative drafters). Canons of construction are generally split into two categories: textual canons and
substantive canons. See, e.g., Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
1, 7 (2006). “Textual canons provide guidance in discerning the meaning of a particular word or phrase through
the examination of its context within the text of the statute.” Id. (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP P.
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 824 (3d ed. 2002)). Substantive canons, however, “reflect particular policy judgments or
normative values,” such as the rule of lenity and the doctrine that “courts should avoid interpreting statutes in
ways that would render them unconstitutional.” Id. (citations omitted). Textual canons are addressed in this
section while substantive canons, specifically the rule of lenity, are addressed in much greater detail in the next
section.
240
Liu, supra note 97, at 309 (citations omitted). This view is further supported by the fact that “the Court
has invoked the ‘traditional tools of construction’ . . . in ordinary cases of statutory interpretation, in which no
administrative interpretation was at issue.” Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
241
See BRANNON & COLE, supra note 239, at 14–15 (highlighting specific tools on which courts disagree);
Gluck, supra note 97, at 618 (“The problem . . . is that the Court never sets out what those ‘traditional tools’ are,
likely because it could not agree on them if it wanted to.”); Liu, supra note 97, at 309–10 (highlighting conflicts
that arise regarding the use of the tools of construction among different interpretive schools).
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generally.”242 Textualist judges generally argue that the tools considered as part
of the Step One inquiry should “be confined to an examination of statutory text
and structure,” while intentionalist and purposivist judges generally argue that
“other sources of statutory meaning, particularly legislative history, should be
consulted as well.”243 The Supreme Court added little to this discussion in Kisor,
and only made clear that courts should not conclude that a regulation is
genuinely ambiguous unless it has carefully considered “the text, structure,
history, and purpose of [the] regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no
agency to fall back on.”244
The Court also made clear, however, that Auer deference is “rooted in a
presumption about congressional intent—a presumption that Congress would
generally want the agency to play the primary role in resolving regulatory
ambiguities.”245 Importantly, presumptions about Congress’s intent can be
limited by other indications of intent regarding the delegation of rulemaking
authority.246 And, in the sentencing context, this means that courts should defer
to Congress’s intent in delegating rulemaking authority to the Sentencing
Commission—as reflected in the Sentencing Reform Act—not just the general
presumption about congressional intent.
The Guidelines Manual itself makes explicit Congress’s goals in creating
the Sentencing Commission and delegating rulemaking authority to it, and this
should guide how the interpretive tools are used by the courts.247 Because
Congress indicated that it was concerned with (1) treating criminal defendants
fairly and (2) reducing arbitrary and excessive punishments, courts should
utilize their interpretive toolbox in a manner that is consistent with these
goals.248 As a result, the Guidelines Manual—and its sentencing guidelines,

242
Liu, supra note 97, at 309; see 4 KOCH & MURPHY, supra note 93, § 11.35. Empirical studies have
reported that differences in the usage of interpretive tools by judges across the ideological spectrum are not as
great as previously imagined. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1328 (2018)
(finding that the vast majority of circuit court judges identified purpose as an appropriate interpretive tool).
243
Liu, supra note 97, at 309–10. Interestingly, the Court considered legislative history as part of Step
One in Chevron itself. 467 U.S. at 862–64. The discussion of legislative history in Chevron, however, “may
simply reflect the fact that the opinion was written by Justice Stevens, or the fact that in 1984 the new textualism
had yet to emerge as a viable alternative to intentionalism and purposivism.” Liu, supra note 97, at 310.
244
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).
245
Id. at 2412 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
246
The presumption that Congress intends “the agency to play the primary role in regulatory ambiguities”
derives itself from the broader delegation of rulemaking authority. Id.
247
See generally 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, at ch. 1, pt. A (describing the goals of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the statutory basis for the Guidelines Manual); supra Part I.
248
See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, at ch. 1, pt. A.
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policy statements, and commentary—should be construed in light of the goals
of fairness and the reduction of arbitrary and excessive punishments. Such an
approach is consistent with a robust use of interpretive tools at Step One of the
Auer analysis to ensure that the sentencing guideline at issue is genuinely
ambiguous before deferring to commentary that purports to interpret it. And,
importantly, such an approach would increase the likelihood that a criminal
defendant would have fair warning of how their conduct would be treated by the
Guidelines Manual, unlike the current system.
Thus, by strictly applying the traditional tools of statutory construction that
compose the interpretive toolbox, courts can properly determine the meaning of
the sentencing guidelines in a manner that is just and equitable to both criminal
defendants, victims of crime, and society more generally. In the event that a
sentencing guideline still appears to be ambiguous after a strict application of
the above tools, courts should then use the rule of lenity and other substantive
canons to determine the unambiguous meaning of the guideline at issue. Such
an approach is highly desirable, as it will substantially limit the ability of the
Sentencing Commission to use commentary in a manner that is adverse to
criminal defendants.
B. Lenity and Other Substantive Canons of Construction
Significantly, some substantive canons249 have been treated as part of the
traditional tools of statutory construction and utilized by courts as part of
Chevron Step One,250 now incorporated as part of the Auer analysis.251 When
properly applied, courts can use these canons to avoid a finding of genuine
ambiguity, which precludes the grant of Auer deference to an agency’s
interpretation of that regulation.252 And, in the sentencing context, finding that a
sentencing guideline is not genuinely ambiguous could have the effect of
substantially reducing the length of a criminal defendant’s incarceration.253

249
Substantive canons are “policy-based background norms or presumptions.” Anita S. Krishnakumar,
Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 826 (2017).
250
See Gluck, supra note 97, at 618; Liu, supra note 97, at 308–09; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2110 (1990). It appears that most judges are willing to
consider canons when issues of statutory interpretation arise. See, e.g., Gluck & Posner, supra note 242, at 1328.
In an empirical study, each of the forty-two circuit court judges that were interviewed reported using both canons
and legislative history to some extent. Id. Moreover, “there [did] not seem to be any link between their canon
use and the political party of their nominating Presidents, or their denominations as conservative or liberal.” Id.
251
See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
252
See, e.g., Liu, supra note 97, at 336.
253
See, e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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While courts could use other substantive canons of construction as part of
the Auer analysis, one that is unique to the sentencing context is the rule of
lenity,254 which “counsels that criminal laws should be narrowly interpreted in
favor of criminal defendants.”255 While courts and scholars disagree on how
lenity applies when it overlaps with Chevron deference, it can be used by courts
in a manner that favors criminal defendants and furthers the substantive goals of
the Sentencing Reform Act Specifically, courts can use lenity to avoid a finding
that (1) a sentencing guideline is genuinely ambiguous,256 and (2) commentary
that purports to interpret a sentencing guideline contains a reasonable
interpretation of it.257 Thus, a liberal use of lenity by the courts will appropriately
protect criminal defendants and limit the potential for overstep by the Sentencing
Commission.
1. The Origin, Application, and Operation of Lenity
The rule of lenity “first emerged in 16th-century England . . . , though it did
not gain broad acceptance [there] until the following century.”258 American
courts first invoked lenity in the 1810s as they were faced with the “task of
interpreting ambiguous language in early criminal statutes, . . . [and] looked to
the [British] rule of lenity for assistance.”259 The Supreme Court initially
explained that “[t]he rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly . . . [was]
founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the
plain principal that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature, not in

254
In a survey of judges, thirteen federal circuit court judges (out of forty-two respondents) “singled out
lenity and/or constitutional avoidance as ‘actual rules’ and distinguished them from the other [substantive]
canons, in terms of their mandatory application.” Gluck & Posner, supra note 242, at 1331–32; see also Phillip
M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 512–13 (2002) (internal citation omitted)
(identifying the rule of lenity “as one of the . . . most ‘venerable’ canons of statutory interpretation”).
255
Id. at 511–12.
256
This corresponds with Step One of the Auer analysis.
257
This corresponds with Step Two of the Auer analysis.
258
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2567 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). One
scholar posits that the “rule of lenity, as we understand it today, . . . [is] a distinctively American creation, driven
by distinctively American concerns.” Spector, supra note 254, at 520. Spector argues that “[t]he vast
preponderance of evidence . . . indicates that the British rule of lenity was a sentencing rule of lenity,” while the
substantive rule of lenity, which applies to criminal statutes, “is an American creation, forged in the furnace of
American constitutionalism.” Id. at 521.
259
Id. at 522; see United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820) (noting that “penal laws are to be
construed strictly”); United States v. Sheldon, 15 U.S. 119, 121 (1817) (cautioning against “construing a penal
law by equity, so as to extend it to cases not within the correct and ordinary meaning of the expressions of the
law”); see also Spector, supra note 254, at 522–27 (discussing the rule of lenity’s early history in the United
States). While this early usage of lenity reflects the canon’s long history in the United States, the Supreme Court
contemplated strict construction of criminal statutes even before its decisions in Wiltberger and Sheldon. See
Insitar A. Rabb, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 193 n.73 (2018).
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the judicial department.”260 The Supreme Court then expanded on this rationale
a century later and indicated that there was “a due process requirement that a
‘fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain law is passed.”261 Thus,
since its import to the United States, the rule of lenity has been grounded
constitutionally, with (1) the liberty rights of defendants,262 (2) legislative
supremacy,263 and (3) the due process requirements of fair warning264 each
justifying its continued use.265
The use of lenity, however, has changed over time, with an increasing
number of cases focusing on “the imposition of punishment as the gravamen of
the rule.”266 The result of this transition is that “nearly half of all the cases in
which the Supreme Court has invoked the rule of lenity have been sentencing
cases,” something that has significant implications in the context of the
Guidelines Manual.267 While the Supreme Court has not directly considered
“whether the rule of lenity applies to the Sentencing Guidelines,”268 the vast

260

Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 95; see Rabb, supra note 259, at 193.
Rabb, supra note 259, at 194 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)). There is a
broader understanding of this notice rationale that recognizes that “the requirement of a clear statement checks
the discretion of aggressive prosecutors . . . [and] counteracts the natural tendency of an agency to strengthen
itself and make its task of enforcement easier by broadly construing its authorizing statute.” Greenfield, supra
note 233, at 57–58. Moreover, “lenity is one of several canons ‘intended to respond to systemic biases in
governmental processes and thus to promote principles of fair dealing.’” Id. at 58 (quoting Sunstein, supra note
250, at 2115).
262
This rationale has been largely ignored by the Supreme Court; “[o]nly the Warren Court consistently
used the defendants’ rights justification for lenity.” Rabb, supra note 259, at 194, 194 n.76.
263
See generally id. at 194 n.77 (2018) (summarizing arguments that legislative supremacy and fair
warning are the bases of the rule of lenity).
264
Several federal circuit court judges responding to a survey “deemed lenity to be a binding rule justified
on the basis of legislative supremacy alone.” Rabb, supra note 259, at 194 (citing Gluck & Posner, supra note
242, at 1331–32).
265
Some scholars have rejected each of these bases as sufficient to justify the rule of lenity. See, e.g.,
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 886, 906–10 (2004) (rejecting
notice and legislative supremacy as flawed grounds upon which to rationalize the rule of lenity). Other scholars
have suggested that there are other nonconstitutional rationales that justify the rule of lenity. See, e.g., id. at 886–
87 (positing that the rule of lenity’s best justification “may be found in its role in structuring the processes of
criminal lawmaking and law enforcement”); Spector, supra note 254, at 556–64 (discussing several
nonconstitutional rationales for the rule of lenity).
266
Id. at 527. Hereafter, the rule of lenity as applied to criminal statutes will be referred to as the
substantive rule of lenity and the rule of lenity as applied to sentencing statutes will be referred to as the
sentencing rule of lenity.
267
Id. at 513. One scholar describes the rule of lenity as the “rule against applying punitive sanctions if
there is ambiguity underlying criminal liability or criminal penalty,” which clearly encompasses a sentencing
rule of lenity. Greenfield, supra note 239, at 8 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 104 (1994)).
268
United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 717 (11th Cir. 2010) (Pryor, J., concurring).
261
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majority of the circuit courts have considered the issue and concluded that the
rule of lenity applies to the Guidelines Manual with the same force as it applies
to substantive criminal statutes.269 The Second Circuit justified an application of
lenity to the sentencing guidelines on the ground that it worked toward lenity’s
goals, namely “to promote fair notice to those subject to criminal laws, to
minimize the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement, and to maintain the
proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts.”270 Other circuit
courts, however, have not embraced a sentencing rule of lenity with the same
zeal in the context of the Guidelines Manual.271
Courts also differ as to how they apply lenity, which informs the canon’s use
in the context of both Chevron deference and Auer deference.272 Some courts
use a lenity-first approach, in which courts first “identify all plausible
interpretations [of a provision] based on the usual interpretive considerations,”
before choosing “the narrowest [of] such reading[s].”273 Other courts use a
lenity-last approach, in which courts first “identify[] all plausible interpretations
through their preferred methods of statutory interpretation . . . [and] then apply
what they deem to be the most plausible or fair reading [of the provision].”274
Under the lenity-last approach, “courts only resort to lenity if, after considering
every other interpretive tool available, they still cannot make sense of the statute

269
See, e.g., United States v. D.M., 869 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We have held that the rule of
lenity applies to the Sentencing Guidelines.”); United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 269 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“The rule [of lenity] covers criminal prohibitions as well as penalties, and applies to the Sentencing
Guidelines.”); United States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Although the provisions of
the Sentencing Guidelines are not statutes, we apply the rule of lenity to them when we find that they are
ambiguous.”); United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2002) (“We join several of our sister circuits
in applying the rule of lenity to the Guidelines.”); United States v. Lazaro-Guadaramma, 71 F.3d 1419, 1421
(8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he rule of lenity applies to ambiguous provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines.”).
270
Simpson, 319 F.3d at 86–87 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988)).
271
See, e.g., Wright, 607 F.3d at 716–19 (arguing that “the purposes of the rule of lenity suggest that it
plays no role in the interpretation of advisory guidelines” post-Booker); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490,
497–98 (7th Cir. 1989) (arguing that the rule of lenity does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines because the
purposes underlying the rule of lenity are not in play), abrogated on other grounds by Stinson v. United States,
508 U.S. 26 (1993); Spector, supra note 254, at 535–64 (arguing that the purposes underlying the rule of lenity
do not support a sentencing rule of lenity).
272
See, e.g., Rabb, supra note 259, at 188–93.
273
Id. at 189. This approach to lenity “was common on the Supreme Court when lenity was first
incorporated into American law and continued to be in use until relatively recently.” Id. Unlike other approaches
to lenity, lenity-first operates as a “‘front end presumption effectively shaping the interpretive process’ when
judges use it to adopt a (plausible) narrow construction of a criminal statute.” Id. at 192 (quoting James J.
Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1208
(2010)).
274
Id. at 190. Under the lenity-last approach, courts can include “broad constructions [of provisions] based
on a purpose gleaned from the overall policy or legislative history that they read as informing the text.” Id.
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and ‘grievous ambiguity’ persists.”275 Finally, Justice Scalia has advocated a
textualist rule of lenity, in which courts only use the textual tools of
interpretation to identify each plausible reading of an ambiguous provision,
before using the rule of lenity to counsel “a narrow construction . . . based on a
smaller set of plausible interpretations from the lenity-first approach.”276 As
such, the way that each court applies lenity will affect the role that the canon
will play in the proposed solution.
2. How Lenity Interacts with Chevron Deference
While Chevron deference and the rule of lenity are often viewed as
competing doctrines that each occupy their own lane, there are circumstances in
which the doctrines overlap and interact with one another.277 Significantly, this
interaction informs how the Auer analysis can accommodate lenity in the
sentencing context, because the Supreme Court incorporated the test for
Chevron deference as part of the Auer analysis in Kisor.278 This interaction also
informs how lenity can be used in a manner that favors criminal defendants and
protects them from the whims of the administrative state.
Chevron deference and lenity intersect when a statute is regulatory in nature
and provides for criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms.279 While such
statutes are not common, courts must decide whether to “choose the more
lenient . . . of [the permissible interpretations] or defer to the government’s
275
Id. (citations omitted). The lenity-last approach “puts lenity ‘dead last,’ replacing the Court’s oncedominant lenity-first approach.” Id. at 190–91 (quoting Price, supra note 265, at 891–99); see Shon Hopwood,
Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695, 698 (2017). Unlike other approaches to lenity, “[l]enity last
works more like a tiebreaker when judges invoke it only ‘at the back end of that process’ to adopt a narrow
construction only when there is no other means of resolving the meaning of a disputed provisions of a criminal
statute.” Rabb, supra note 259, at 192 (quoting Brudney, supra note 273, at 1208).
276
Rabb, supra note 259, at 191. Justice Scalia “argued that the rule was the best means of respecting three
important values: legislative supremacy, fair warning (with prosecutorial restraint), and defendants’ rights.” Id.
(citation omitted). Functionally, this “textualist rule of lenity works more like a clear statement rule when, at the
slightest hint of ambiguity, [Justice Scalia] advocates for lenity as a way of requiring Congress to clearly speak
to the issue at hand in lieu of declaring criminal liability.” Id. at 192.
277
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905, 909–10 (2007).
The Supreme Court has rejected Chevron deference in criminal cases for two reasons. See id. at 918. First, the
Department of Justice “does not ‘administer’ the criminal code,” which is required for Chevron deference. Id.
Second, “government prosecutors have an incentive to construe [criminal statutes] broadly, meaning that to defer
to such interpretations would ‘replac[e] the doctrine of lenity with a doctrine of severity.’” Id. (quoting Crandon
v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
278
See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019); supra Part II.E.
279
Hickman, supra note 277, at 912. The Internal Revenue Code is an example of a statute that has both
civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms. Id. (“[T]he problem at hand arises when a provision in the Code,
or any regulatory statute with both criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms, is susceptible of two or more
identifiable and equally defensible alternative interpretations.”).

FABER_3.8.21

2021]

3/8/2021 4:57 PM

KISOR v. WILKIE

947

preference for a different choice.”280 In most cases, the Supreme Court has come
down on the side of lenity and construed the statutes in favor of defendants.281
But in other cases, the Supreme Court has rejected lenity in favor of Chevron
deference to the government’s interpretation.282 Despite these disparate
holdings, the framework that courts and scholars have deduced from these
decisions instructs how lenity can be incorporated into the Auer framework, so
as to restrain agencies from substantively changing criminal law through
administrative interpretations.283
First, some scholars propose that courts should use lenity as a traditional tool
of construction in Step One of the Chevron analysis.284 In Step One, lenity would
280

Id.
See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–12 n.8 (2004) (observing that lenity required the Court to
interpret an immigration statute in an immigrant’s favor because the relevant provision had “both criminal and
noncriminal applications”); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 (1992) (applying
lenity in determining the meaning of a regulatory statute that could serve as the basis of criminal liability);
Crandon, 494 U.S. at 168 (applying lenity to reject the government’s broader interpretation of a criminal statute
in a civil case). See generally Hickman, supra note 277, at 912 (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court
has applied lenity when determining the meaning of hybrid statutes).
282
See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995)
(rejecting an argument that lenity required a narrower interpretation of a hybrid regulatory statute when the
government had publicly communicated its longstanding interpretation of the relevant provision); see also
Hickman, supra note 277, at 921 (attempting to reconcile the holding in Babbitt with the Supreme Court’s other
jurisprudence regarding the interaction between lenity and Chevron deference). While the Supreme Court’s
decision “came down on the side of Chevron deference, instead of lenity for a longstanding, legally-binding
regulation, . . . the Court’s jurisprudence to date has not addressed the question of lenity versus deference for
guidance formats that are less formal than binding regulations published in the Code of Federal Regulations.”
Hickman, supra note 277, at 933; see also Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019, 1031 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “cases since Babbitt have not followed the
reading the court [found] itself constrained to follow”), rev’d, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562
(2017).
283
For a discussion of this framework by scholars, see Hickman, supra note 277, at 933–40; Greenfield,
supra note 239, at 48–55; Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 574–82 (2003); Justin Levine, Comment, A Clash of Canons: Lenity, Chevron, and the OneStatute, One-Interpretation Rule, 107 GEO. L.J. 1423, 1434–38 (2019); William T. Gillis, Note, An Unstable
Equilibrium: Evaluating the Third Way Between Chevron Deference and the Rule of Lenity, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 352, 353–59 (2019); Caitlin Miller, Comment, The Balancing Act Between Chevron Deference and the
Rule of Lenity, 18 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 193, 209–16 (2017); David Hahn, Silent and Ambiguous: The Supreme
Court Dodges Chevron and Lenity in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, MINN. L. REV. (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://minnesotalawreview.org/2017/11/29/silent-and-ambiguous/#post-2596-endnote-34. For a discussion of
this framework by courts, see Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984, 991 (6th Cir. 2018); Esquivel-Quintana, 810
F.3d at 1027–32; Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 731 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring).
Other scholars have also focused on the relationship between the Chevron framework and the substantive canons
more generally. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 97, at 335–43.
284
See Hickman, supra note 277, at 934; Greenfield, supra note 239, at 48–51. The Supreme Court has
previously used language indicating that lenity is a substantive canon that courts can use to determine if a statute
is ambiguous, which comports with Step One of the Chevron analysis. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005); Hickman, supra note 277, at 934. But see supra note 282
281
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“operate as a tie-breaker between competing statutory interpretations to establish
[the] statute’s supposed plain meaning.”285 The result of lenity’s use in this
manner would be that a “court applying [it] [would] never get[] past that firstlevel inquiry and . . . [would] not have the opportunity to defer to the
government.”286 This use of lenity best resolves the tension between the canon
and Chevron deference, as it properly recognizes that Chevron deference is
largely predicated on a presumed delegation of interpretive power to an agency,
whereas lenity exists as a protector of the liberty and due process rights of
criminal defendants and the legislative supremacy of Congress in the sentencing
context.287 But, the use of lenity in this manner might not always be desirable,
as it could “foreclose the opportunity for the agency subsequently to adopt an
alternative interpretation, even through the notice-and-comment process, and
thus would put courts rather than the agency in the position of resolving statutory
ambiguity.”288
Second, some scholars propose that courts should use lenity in Step Two of
the Chevron analysis to limit the permissible range of interpretations that an
agency could adopt.289 Using lenity in Step Two would “modify lenity somewhat
from a dispositive tie-breaker canon to a canon that acts as a factor,” but this
change “would not lessen [lenity’s] value.”290 Instead, lenity would retain
significant importance and “set the scope of possible constructions, helping to
determine the reasonableness of the agency interpretation.”291 As such, a strong
application of lenity in this manner would restrict the permissible constructions
of an ambiguous statute to those that are least detrimental to criminal defendants.
and accompanying text.
285
Hickman, supra note 277, at 934.
286
Id. The Supreme Court has previously found that other “manners of presumptions, substantive canons,
and clear statement rules” operate at Step One of the Chevron analysis and “take precedence over conflicting
agency views.” Carter, 736 F.3d at 731.
287
Hickman, supra note 277, at 934–36. Whether lenity is “an absolute constitutional requirement rather
than a quasi-constitutional canon of construction is questionable,” as some states have even “rejected the rule of
lenity in drafting their own criminal statutes.” Id. at 935 (citations omitted).
288
Id. at 936; cf. Slocum, supra note 283, at 542. (“[If] the immigration rule of lenity is a ‘traditional tool
of statutory construction’ in the sense meant by the Court in Chevron, reviewing courts would never defer to the
agency’s interpretation because the issue would be resolved at Step One.”).
289
See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 239, at 51–53; Slocum, supra note 283, at 574–82; Levine, supra note
283, at 1436. Courts differ in how they understand Step Two of the Chevron analysis. Slocum, supra note 283,
at 575. Some courts find that Step Two merely entails seeing if the agency’s interpretation can be supported. Id.
Other courts find that Step Two entails a more searching inquiry into whether the agency’s interpretation “is
supported by a reasonable explanation and is logically coherent.” Id. at 576 (citations omitted). The latter view
is often associated with a merger of Step Two of the Chevron analysis and “review under the [APA’s] arbitrary
and capricious standard.” Id. at 576 n.374.
290
Id. at 577–78.
291
See Levine, supra note 283, at 1436.
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Because the Supreme Court has adopted the test for Chevron deference as
part of the Auer analysis, an understanding of the interaction between the rule of
lenity and Chevron deference can guide how lenity applies in the context of Auer
deference. And, in fact, the sentencing context itself substantially heightens the
need for a strong rule of lenity to appropriately protect criminal defendants.
3. How Lenity Should Interact with Auer Deference
When there is ambiguity in the criminal context, the defendant is typically
favored, as demonstrated by the maxim that one cannot be criminally convicted
if there is reasonable doubt as to their guilt.292 Lenity also favors criminal
defendants when statutes are ambiguous by “constru[ing] the [ambiguous]
statute in the criminal defendant’s favor.”293 But, when Auer deference applies
in the sentencing context because there is ambiguity, the criminal defendant is
not favored.294 Instead, an application of Auer deference “mean[s] that rather
than benefitting from any ambiguity in the [g]uidelines, [a criminal defendant]
would face the possibility of more time in prison than [they] otherwise would,”
which “threatens the separation of powers . . . [and] endangers fundamental
legal precepts as well.”295 As such, there is a strong argument for an account of
Auer deference that appropriately accommodates lenity. Stated simply,
“[a]gencies, no less than courts, must honor the rule of lenity.”296
The new framework for Auer deference as presented in Kisor,297 however,
leaves sufficient room for lenity and allows it to serve as a powerful tool to limit
the Sentencing Commission’s ability to interpret ambiguous sentencing
guidelines in a manner contrary to the interests of criminal defendants through
commentary. When coupled with a strict application of the tools of
construction,298 lenity can limit Auer deference in a way that is protective of
criminal defendants, and still leave the Sentencing Commission the flexibility

292
See Havis I, 907 F.3d 439, 451 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“[I]n criminal
cases, ambiguity typically favors the defendant[,] [and] [i]f there is reasonable doubt, no conviction.”), vacated
by reh’g en banc, 921 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2019).
293
Id. (citation omitted).
294
Id.
295
Id. (citing Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 732–33 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J.,
concurring); Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984, 990–91 (6th Cir. 2018)). If lenity yielded to both Chevron
deference and Auer deference, unseemly consequences could also result. Carter, 736 F.3d at 732–33. Such a
rule would “give each agency two ways of construing criminal laws against the defendant—by resolving
ambiguities in the criminal statute and by resolving ambiguities in any regulation.” Id. at 733.
296
Id. at 736
297
See supra Part II.E.
298
See supra Part IV.A.
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that is necessary to act through commentary to best effectuate the goals of the
Sentencing Reform Act.
Courts could uniformly go the way of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and
find that “Auer deference does not apply in criminal cases.”299 Underlying these
decisions is the idea that (1) “the public is entitled to ‘fair warning’ of prohibited
conduct if it can be penalized for engaging in such behavior,”300 and (2) the law
“must provide a reasonably clear standard of culpability to circumscribe the
discretion of the enforcing authority and its agents.”301 Such an approach would
favor criminal defendants and deny Auer deference to commentary that is
harmful to criminal defendants. In the event that courts are not willing to go that
far, however, the framework used at the intersection of Chevron deference and
the rule of lenity can be imported and modified to have a similar, beneficial
impact when Auer deference potentially applies.
As such, in the sentencing context, courts should treat lenity as a traditional
tool of construction and utilize it in Step One of the Auer analysis, especially “in
this era of overcriminalization and excessive punishment.”302 An application of
lenity in this manner would require a return to the lenity-first approach that
dominated the Supreme Court’s early understanding of the canon or an embrace
of Justice Scalia’s textualist rule of lenity.303 Such a return, however, should be
welcome, because it would substantially limit ambiguity in the sentencing
guidelines that would lend itself to interpretation in commentary, possibly to the
detriment of criminal defendants. Additionally, such an understanding of lenity
correctly reflects that Congress would not intend to delegate the Sentencing
Commission interpretive authority when such a delegation compromises the
“certainty and predictability that the justice system as a whole derives from
ensuring that [provisions] providing for criminal punishments contain clear
statements.”304 And, as a matter of policy, this understanding of lenity would
299
United States v. Phifer, 909 F.3d 372, 385 (11th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Moss, 872 F.3d
304, 314 (5th Cir. 2017) (“If this case involved only civil sanctions against the appellees, the government would
perhaps ask this court to apply Auer deference to its interpretation of the regulations.”); Diamond Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976) (“If a violation of a regulation
subjects private parties to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency
intended but did not adequately express.”). The Fifth Circuit had previously found that the rule of lenity applied
to the sentencing guidelines, while the Eleventh Circuit had not previously reached that decision. See United
States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Although the provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines are not statutes, we apply the rule of lenity to them when we find that they are ambiguous.”).
300
Phifer, 909 F.3d at 384 (citing Diamond Roofing Co., 528 F.2d at 649).
301
Id. (quoting Diamond Roofing Co., 528 F.2d at 649) (internal quotation marks omitted).
302
Hopwood, supra note 275, at 699.
303
See id. at 700–01; supra notes 273, 276, and accompanying text.
304
Elkan Abromwitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The Rule of Lenity in Sentencing, 239 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 4, 2008

FABER_3.8.21

2021]

3/8/2021 4:57 PM

KISOR v. WILKIE

951

allow courts to ensure that the Sentencing Commission formulates the
Guidelines Manual in the manner that best effectuates the policies underlying
the Sentencing Reform Act.305
An application of lenity in Step Two of the Auer analysis could be similarly
beneficial for criminal defendants. While this step is generally viewed as highly
deferential to the agency’s interpretation,306 an application of lenity here could
greatly restrict the range of permissible interpretations of ambiguous sentencing
guidelines to those that are least detrimental to criminal defendants. Under this
approach, courts are “require[d] . . . to accept only those agency interpretations
that are reasonable in light of [the] principles of construction [that] courts
normally employ,”307 which leaves room for the use of lenity in Step Two, “even
if [the] canon did not have a dispositive effect in Step One.”308 Thus, when the
Sentencing Commission interprets sentencing guidelines in a manner that is
detrimental to the interests of criminal defendants through commentary, this
approach could lead to the conclusion that the Commission’s interpretation is
not reasonable in light of the presumption that ambiguous sentencing guidelines
are to be interpreted in favor of criminal defendants.
C. The Result—A More Limited Role for Commentary
By strictly applying the traditional tools of statutory construction in Step
One of the Auer analysis, courts can drastically restrict the number of cases in
which sentencing guidelines are found to be genuinely ambiguous, foreclosing
Auer deference to the guidelines’ commentary. And, even if the traditional tools
of statutory construction fail to resolve the apparent ambiguity in a sentencing
guideline, an application of lenity in either Step One or Step Two of the Auer
analysis would substantially restrict the ability of the Sentencing Commission to
interpret sentencing guidelines in a manner that is contrary to the interests of

(quoting Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers and Families Against Mandatory Minimums as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11–12, Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124 (2008) (No. 06-11429),
2008 WL 261196)).
305
See supra Part I.B. (discussing the policies underlying the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
306
Cf. supra note 170 (describing how deferential courts are at Step Two of the Chevron analysis). An
insufficient amount of time has elapsed since the Supreme Court adopted the test for Chevron deference as part
of the test for Auer deference for scholarship to have examined the same issue in the context of Auer deference.
307
Greenfield, supra note 239, at 51–52 (quoting Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259–60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
308
Id. at 52. The rule of lenity “may . . . constrain the possible number of reasonable ways to read an
ambiguity in a statute, though the application of the canon alone may not suffice to make the intent of the statute
sufficiently clear for the court to pronounce” what the agency intended. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t
of Transp., 93 F.3d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

FABER_3.8.21

952

3/8/2021 4:57 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:905

criminal defendants through commentary.309 In either case, the Sentencing
Commission would no longer be able to use commentary in an impermissible
manner, and the function of commentary would return to that originally intended
by Congress.310
Notably, the Sentencing Commission would not be handcuffed by the
decision of a court to deny Auer deference to a commentary provision.311
Instead, the Sentencing Commission would be free to amend the sentencing
guidelines to effectuate the substantive change attempted by the commentary,
subject to the restrictions contained in the Sentencing Reform Act.312 By
adopting a more uniform approach to the Auer analysis, courts would limit the
intra- and inter-circuit differences that abound in the current system and reduce
the threat to criminal defendants from the actions of the Sentencing Commission
in the absence of its usual rulemaking process.313
Implementation of this proposal would affect the ways in which commentary
can be used by the Sentencing Commission in the future. No longer could the
Sentencing Commission use commentary as a stopgap measure to avoid
amending the sentencing guidelines when the commentary is detrimental to
criminal defendants. Instead, the Sentencing Commission would have to be
more purposeful in amending the sentencing guidelines when the desired
changes negatively affect criminal defendants. While such a change could pose
problems for the Sentencing Commission in the short run,314 it would be unlikely
to have large impacts on the Commission’s operations in the long run.

309
If commentary is rejected because the underlying guideline is not genuinely ambiguous or the
commentary is not a reasonable interpretation of it, courts would be left with the tools of statutory construction
to resolve any ambiguity. As such, this schema represents a partial return to the system that existed before the
Sentencing Reform Act was enacted and may raise some of the same concerns that led to the Act in the first
place. See supra Part I.A.
310
See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
311
Nor would Congress be handcuffed, for that matter, as Congress is always able to take legislative action
to affect criminal sentencing.
312
See supra note 70.
313
Today, the threat to criminal defendants is substantially heightened because the Sentencing
Commission’s composition does not resemble what Congress envisioned when it originally passed the
Sentencing Reform Act. See supra notes 21, 54, and 61.
314
Currently, the Sentencing Commission has two voting members and two non-voting members. About,
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about-page (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). The Sentencing
Commission, however, “must have at least four voting commissioners for a quorum.” U.S. Sentencing
Commission Publishes for Comment Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/december-13-2018. Thus, the
Sentencing Commission will be unable to amend the sentencing guidelines until additional members are
appointed, and it is unclear when the Commission will regain a quorum.
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That is not to say, however, that commentary would cease to have any use
for the Sentencing Commission. Instead, the Sentencing Commission could
continue to use commentary to interpret sentencing guidelines that are
ambiguous, so long as the commentary does not interpret the guidelines in a
manner that is adverse to criminal defendants.315 Thus, what would emerge is a
system that appropriately protects criminal defendants while still allowing the
Sentencing Commission the flexibility to interpret sentencing guidelines
through commentary, provided that criminal defendants are not adversely
affected.316
CONCLUSION
While there has been increased attention on the necessity of criminal justice
reform in the United States, limited attention has been paid to the role that the
Sentencing Commission has played in exacerbating the very problems that it
was designed to address. Because the Supreme Court sanctioned the application
of Auer deference to the Guidelines Manual’s commentary in Stinson v. United
States, the Sentencing Commission has enacted commentary that purports to
interpret ambiguous sentencing guidelines, but actually makes substantive
changes to the underlying guidelines in the absence of the protections included
in the Sentencing Reform Act. When the Sentencing Commission acts in this
arbitrary manner, it is subject only to the limited check on federal agencies that
accompanies its position in the executive branch, something that is not desirable
given the dominant role the Commission plays in determining whether and how
long criminal offenders will be incarcerated by the State.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court provided courts a tool in Kisor v. Wilkie
that can be used to eliminate the Sentencing Commission’s use of commentary
in this manner. By importing the test for Chevron deference as part of the Auer
analysis, the Supreme Court gave courts an opportunity to take a more active
role in restricting the ability of the Sentencing Commission to act in a manner
that is detrimental to criminal defendants and contrary to the wishes of Congress.
Significantly, courts can deny Auer deference to commentary that was drafted

315
Commentary could be used to interpret the sentencing guidelines in a manner that is neutral or benefits
criminal defendants. For example, the Sentencing Commission could continue to use commentary to explain
what actions qualify criminal defendants for a sentence reduction when they accept responsibility for their
offenses. See 2018 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1.
316
It is possible that strictly applying the traditional tools of statutory construction in Step One of the Auer
analysis would render most of the sentencing guidelines unambiguous, which would limit the utility of
commentary. But this result is unlikely, as tools like the rule of lenity apply much more strongly when
commentary is detrimental to criminal defendants.
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in a manner that could be abusive to criminal defendants by (1) strictly applying
the traditional tools of statutory construction and (2) using the rule of lenity. As
a result, Auer deference would no longer handcuff courts in how they apply the
sentencing guidelines; instead, courts would be free to interpret the sentencing
guidelines as they would normally interpret statutes and regulations when Auer
deference is not warranted, a result that would be beneficial for both criminal
defendants and society at large.
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